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INTRODUCTION
I do not recommend reading Manliness. I could stop there, and I wouldn't
feel as if I'd done the book a disservice. But to make sure readers don't waste
their time and money, I'll provide an overview that deals with some of Harvey
Mansfield's apparent concerns in Part I of this review. In Parts II and III, I raise
and provide tentative answers to questions far more important than Mansfield's
muddled and passionless plea for the status quo.
Contrary to what Mansfield sometimes implies, but never really commits
to, feminism has been good, not bad, for society. Feminist politics has worked
and continues to work a mostly wonderful revolution in the way we live our
lives and choose our aspirations. But most feminist theories that reject gender
essentialism' have been fundamentally problematized-feminist theory is
?Associate Professor of Law, Southwestern Law School. I would like to thank Anshul Amar, Dante
Harper, and the editors of the Yale Journal of Law and Feminism for helpful comments. All errors are
my own.
1. I use the term gender essentialism to mean the belief that gender has essential aspects that are
inevitable and cannot be successfully defied.
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troubled. Mansfield appears to posit this trouble as an inevitable slide toward
nihilism, but he is off the mark.
In Part II, I will examine the real problem with many feminist theories that
reject gender essentialism: the fact that, once the time comes to move on to
normative prescriptions, the theories either fall short or reject that project
altogether. Rejecting gender essentialism leads to the extremely difficult
question of how people with socially constructed identities are to change their
social construction. I will first examine Simone de Beauvoir's call to do the
impossible-transcend gender. I will then examine Catharine MacKinnon's
much less naive efforts to "explode" the obstinate system of gender
subordination. Though MacKinnon characterized her politics as a grassroots
awakening of those most injured by the system, her project felt instead to many
women and queers like a top-down construction that rejected their desires and
wishes. This victim-based politics grappled more directly with the problem of
escaping what constructs one's identity, but to many it was not a convincing
means of exploding gender. Still, this politics seemed arrogant, as if it were
sitting above us in order to raise our consciousness. Finally in this Part, I will
look at postmodern feminism. Postmodern theorists including Judith Butler call
for "gender trouble," not gender transcendence or gender explosion.2 They
embrace the trouble, in an often elegant project that theoretically quiets the
trouble by co-opting it. But for what purpose is the trouble being co-opted?
Postmodern theory has yet to give us implications for politics or law. As Steven
Seidman has said, queer theory and postmodernism seem to have started out
"against identity politics" but ended up promoting an empty, and potentially
irrelevant, "politics against identity."
3
In Part III, I argue that there are real political implications that we can draw
from the rejection of identity politics and essentialism, including gender
essentialism. While anti-essentialism doesn't tell us how to live our lives, it can
tell us what kinds of legal rights to protect and construct, in order to ensure that
there is room to rally against the very real suffering and injustice that social
norms and identities have so often caused.
I. OVERVIEW
Mansfield's book is muddled, and it's hard to connect much of the book
with its apparent thesis: that we live in a "gender-neutral society," or one that
aspires to be so, which attempts to eradicate manliness, the virtue that poses a
challenge to that gender-neutral aspiration.4 According to Mansfield, manliness
2. See, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE 44, 95-96 (2d ed. 1999).
3. Steven Seidman, Identity and Politics in a "Postmodern " Gay Culture: Some Historical and
Conceptual Notes, in FEAR OF A QUEER PLANET: QUEER POLITICS AND SOCIAL THEORY 120, 132
(Michael Warner ed., 1993).
4. HARVEY MANSFIELD, MANLINESS 1-21 (2006).
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is a natural feature of maleness which cannot be defied, and which we must
instead employ and value. 5 How do we do this? By treating the sexes as equal
under the law, in what Mansfield calls the public realm, but expecting them and
encouraging them to be unequal in the private realm,6 where men should be
manly and women should be womanly, in ideally balanced yin/yang-like
heterosexual marriages. 7 Men will do most of the wage labor, women will do
most of the domestic labor, and each will respect the other's contributions to
the family and society. 8 However, men will, naturally, be higher in status and
power than women. Part of their manly role will be to look down on what
women do as beneath them.9 But they will have a respect for women's choice
and sacrifice in taking on these domestic roles, and women will have certain
kinds of indirect power over men,10 as well as a certain kind of feminine
dignity that comes from making a pleasant home."1
One could question whether this prescription differs from the ideal pictured
by the mainstream of American society. Perhaps more importantly, one could
ask how many Americans can afford this lifestyle, even if they want it? Many
men and women have no choice but to engage in full-time wage labor
whenever they can get it. I suspect, though, that Mansfield is concerned with a
certain upper-middle class, heterosexual subset of American society,
exemplified by his academic peers. Many members of this subculture likely do
not accept gender inequality, and certainly not gender subordination, whether
under the law or outside it. I suspect most of these persons take a hands-off
approach, as a legal matter, to the way others choose to arrange their personal
lives-few of them would advocate mandating that all women work as a matter
of law. But many of them will probably not be friends with people who believe
men should dominate women in the home. Some of these persons have the
financial means to divide labor within their families the way Mansfield
proposes, but choose not to. Mansfield seems to be focusing his sights on a
class of Americans quite similar to those Betty Friedan focused on in The
Feminine Mystique.13 Friedan succeeded in changing the social norms
5. Id. at 229.
6. Id. at 241.
7. Id. at 198, 242.
8. Id. at 241-42; see also id. at 79 ("That marriage mutes but does not remove sex differences
suggests that men and women learn from each other .... Isn't it possible that a married couple might be
in love? And when you're in love, you want in your beloved some things you lack but appreciate ....
Or at least, if you cannot change yourself, you can be glad to have a spouse to do what you won't do.").
9. Id. at 7-8, 13, 21, 27, 32, 215.
10. Id. at 143.
II. Id. at 142-43.
12. For instance, members of the faculty of Harvard University, a private school, were deeply
opposed to former President Larry Summers's comments that treated gender inequality in the science
departments at Harvard as a potentially natural state of affairs that, implicitly, need not be altered. See
Jay Tolson et al., Hard Lessons, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 7, 2005, at 30.
13. See generally BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (5th prtg. 2001). As bell hooks notes,
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regarding gender for many of these people; Mansfield wants to change them
back. And like Friedan, Mansfield has masked the fact that his book has a
narrow scope and relevance.
Of course, even a book with limited relevance to many socioeconomic
classes can be worthwhile. 14 Unfortunately, however, large sections of the book
appear logically unconnected to the stated purpose and thesis. Many sections
consist of dull, tiresome assertions of what counts as manly and what doesn't.
15
Manliness is essentially an archetype, but the pages Mansfield spends trying to
describe the archetype are repetitive and supercilious. Other sections of the
book attempt to convince us that feminist writers are not great thinkers, while
classical philosophers are great thinkers and more worth reading. 
16
What does all this have to do with gender roles in our society and the
posited loss of well-employed manliness? It's just not clear. Mansfield devotes
an entire chapter to scientific evidence of inherent gender differences on which
he himself disclaims reliance because he prefers the lessons of art and literature
to those of science.' 7 I will attempt to provide a brief overview of all this, but
one must keep in mind that most of the book actually doesn't serve its stated
purposes.
The portion of this book in which Mansfield displays some real passion
consists in undermining those feminist theorists of whom he is aware (largely
Simone de Beauvoir), 18 while rehabilitating and apologizing for classic thinkers
like Aristotle and Plato. 19 There is also some measured praise for the fathers of
American liberalism, like Hobbes and Mill, as well as a few early feminists like
20
Elizabeth Cady Stanton. But all this has nothing to do with criticizing and
reforming our society's approach to gender-the purported goal of the book-
for if it did, Mansfield wouldn't limit himself to a critique of Beauvoir and a
few radical feminists who had little social or legal impact in America.
She did not speak of the needs of women without men, without children, without homes. She
ignored the existence of all non-white women and poor white women. She did not tell readers
whether it was more fulfilling to be a maid, a babysitter, a factory worker, a clerk, or a
prostitute, than to be a leisure class housewife.
BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO CENTER 1-2 (2d ed. 2000).
14. See HOOKS, supra note 13, at 2 ("Specific problems and dilemmas of leisure-class white
housewives were real concerns that merited consideration and change, but they were not the pressing
political concerns of masses of women."); see also Evelyn Reed, A Study of the Feminine Mystique, 25
INT'L SOCIALIST REV. 24, 24 (1964) (reviewing BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963))
("Betty Friedan's findings have a wider relevance than the well-to-do housewives she has investigated.
These set the pattern of behavior and aspiration for working-class housewives, who mistakenly believe
that because middle-class women have all the advantages, they also have all the answers.").
15. MANSFIELD, supra note 4, at 50-81.
16. Id. at 122-62, 190-228.
17. Id. at 51.
18. Id. at 131.
19. Id. at 204-21.
20. Id. at 124-26, 163-89.
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Those feminists who had a major impact on our social and legal gender
norms include liberal feminist activists like Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, as
well as radical feminists like Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin
(whose names appear nowhere in the book outside of the bibliography).
Cultural or "difference" feminism, too, has had a great deal of purchase in
mainstream America, but neither Robin West2 1 nor Christine Littleton22 nor the
ideas behind cultural feminism are presented or disputed.23 Betty Friedan is of
course too common a household name for Mansfield to pretend she does not
exist, so his means of undermining her is to argue that she, like Beauvoir, was
influenced by communists and "flirts with nihilism." 24 Her liberal feminism is
described as a kind of ruse or grudging compromise, covering up her radical
existentialism.25 She was really no different from Beauvoir, he seems to think,
except that she focused less on sex and more on career.
Mansfield suggests that by denying that humans have essences which are
controlled by nature, Beauvoir and other existentialists leave humans with no
ethical or moral guide; all that guides is the will to power. Thus, he calls
existentialists nihilists. Mansfield writes a broad intellectual history that seeks
to tenuously connect American feminism to Beauvoir, Beauvoir to Nietzche,
and Nietzche to Hitler. 26 His critique of Beauvoir is, in my view, deeply
flawed, though there are certainly legitimate critiques of Beauvoir's work, one
of which I will explore in Part II of this review.
More importantly, however, the critique reveals nothing about what's
wrong with our American "gender-neutral society." Of course, the "gender-
neutral society" that Mansfield argues is problematic is not in fact existentialist,
and certainly not nihilist. People in the "gender-neutral society" may not think
that sex should determine how you live your life, but they do hold all sorts of
views on what constitutes a moral and ethical life. So how does Mansfield draw
a connection between the "gender-neutral" society and nihilism?
21. E.g., Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. C-II. L. REV. 1 (1988); Robin L. West, The
Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIS.
WOMEN'S L.J. 81 (1987).
22. E.g., Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279 (1987).
23. Indeed, Mansfield seems to be a cultural feminist without realizing it. Like cultural feminists,
he believes that men and women contribute different, but valuable, things to society, and that both ways
of speaking, reasoning, and living deserve some form of respect. But crucially, unlike most cultural
feminists Mansfield does not promote respect for women's unique contributions in the form of financial
compensation or leadership roles.
24. MANSFIELD, supra note 4, at 150-51, 153.
25. Id. at 152-54.
26. Id. at 118 ("Although Nietzche himself would never have been a Nazi, his influence helped
create what has been called 'German nihilism'...."); see also id. at 122. ("What interested these
women in Nietzche was the nihilism he proclaimed as fact--God is dead-and the possibility of
creating a new order in its place. Nihilism, or the disappearance of nature, represented
opportunity .... ); id. at 190 ("The only true humanity, according to Beauvoir, so far exclusively male,
is to transcend the given or the natural or the 'immanent' in a manner I have called nihilist because it
accepts no guide but will to power. In the feminist society there are no social roles.").
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To do so, Mansfield has to pretend there is no such thing as a liberal
feminist-someone who simply wants to extend the liberal American values of
equality and liberty to women. He pretends that modem American feminism,
including that which revolutionized our society and made some of it gender-
neutral, is inextricably allied with existentialism. 27 But of course, whoever her
intellectual influences have been, Friedan is a liberal feminist, as is now-Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who, along with others at the American Civil Liberties
Union Women's Rights Project, used impact litigation and legislative change to
ensure the equality of men and women before the law and in the workplace.
28
These two names are recognized by many Americans, and they are feminist
giants in terms of their influence on our social and legal norms, respectively.
The influence they had was a liberal feminist influence. But liberal feminism is
something Mansfield has no real issues with.29 Indeed, his proposal for dealing
with gender roles is classic American legal liberalism, with its division of the
public and private spheres, its prohibition on discrimination in the public
sphere, and its license to discriminate in the private sphere. With respect to law,
he implores us to preserve the status quo.
What Mansfield really wants to do is to promote discrimination in the
private sphere. To do so, he must suggest that equality is somehow normatively
inappropriate to that sphere. Thus, he tries his best to depict modem American
feminism, which is associated with equality, as anti-child and anti-family.
30
27. Id. at 163 ("The revolution that made the gender-neutral society was not led by liberals but by
women of the left, inspired as I have argued, by a womanly nihilism. Their heroine was Simone de
Beauvoir, and behind her, Marx and Nietzche.").
28. Ginsburg founded the ACLU Women's Rights Project [WRP] in 1972. She successfully argued
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), before the Supreme Court, establishing heightened
scrutiny for gender discrimination by the government. In that case and a series of further cases, she used
both male and female plaintiffs to demonstrate that public sex discrimination and governmental
assumptions about the economic roles of men and women harmed both "men and women-indeed,
entire families .... While some would have focused solely on the injustice such rules work on women,
Ginsburg rejected differential treatment based on gender as inherently harmful to all involved." Sandra
Pullman, Tribute: The Legacy of Ruth Bader Ginsburg and WRP Staff, THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION (Mar. 2006), http://www.aclu.org/womensrights/gen/24412pub20060307.html.
Ginsburg was also incredibly pro-family. Brenda Feigen explains, "Both of us [Feigen and
Ginsburg] agreed that we didn't want to deprive the fathers of our children of the experience of being
fathers-or the children of having fathers involved in their daily lives." Id. The WRP fought to end
discrimination against pregnant women, losing in the courts but successfully obtaining passage of the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act. "During these years, WRP set an example of accommodating working
mothers at the office. To balance the competing demands of family and career, women brought their
newborn children to work with them .... College students were hired to look after the infants, and the
lawyers would breastfeed during the day." Id.
29. MANSFIELD, supra note 4, at 188 ("In sum, Mill provides a reasonable case for women's
equality that ought to satisfy reasonable women. It is mostly about careers and occupations, and though
it makes sensible concessions to the doubts of sensible men, it opens all doors to women and allows
them to prove their merit wherever they can. It is not about sexual equality, and, like the case made by
Wollstonecraft and Stanton, it does not attack motherhood and the family.").
30. Mansfield describes the "something more" than husband and children that Friedan wanted
women to have as "something other than 'my husband and my children and my home. "' Id. at 153.
Book Review: Manliness
However, this old anti-feminist tactic rings false to those who know what the
American feminist movement has given to women with families.
Mansfield describes Friedan as a "moderate feminist," who is distinguished
from a "radical feminist" by "not wanting to abolish the family," while
providing no thought about "how women might combine job and family." 3 1 Yet
much of The Feminine Mystique is about exactly this problem, with proposed
solutions ranging from the class-specific "hire a housekeeper" to the use of
modem devices for housework to a rather non-class-centric government
subsidy program designed to help women resume their education through
funding for household help and reformation of higher education.
32
Liberal feminism sought to make women equal to men by giving them the
opportunity to do what men did-primarily, engage in wage labor and get paid
the same for it. In doing so, feminism clearly had to ease the socially produced
domestic obligations that would have left women with no time to engage in
wage labor. But in describing this move as anti-child, Mansfield neglects to
mention, or is perhaps ignorant of, feminist efforts to balance child-rearing with
equality. For instance, the Women's Strike for Equality March organized by
Friedan in 1970 had three core demands, one of which was free childcare. This
is a demand aimed at the need for women to have jobs and children. 33 He is
also either ignorant of or neglects decades of modem American feminist
demands for work flexibility. These demands are aimed at facilitating
engagement in the non-wage provision of childcare by both women and men.
What could be more pro-child and pro-family? These demands have seen
modest success in the Family Medical Leave Act,34 and continue in the work-
life balance movement.35 Finally, Mansfield appears especially ignorant of the
liberal feminism that now-Justice Ginsburg employed to reform our law in
radical ways.36 The following quote sums up Mansfield's ignorance and neglect
well:
The radical feminism I have discussed is not [the feminism] most
women believe or practice, but it is the only feminism there is.
Another, better feminism might begin from the idea that women, as
many of them say, "want it all." They want a career and they want to
be women too. They don't want to be defined, and they do. The
31. Id. at 152-53.
32. For discussion of labor saving devices, see FRIEDAN, supra note 13, at 301-07, 311-12, 341-43.
For discussion of hiring help, see id. at 271, 272, 304, 357, 478. For discussion of the national program,
see id. at 502-03.
33. Aside from free twenty-four-hour child care centers, the strikers wanted free abortion on
demand and equal opportunity in jobs and education. Judy Klemesrud, Coming Wednesday: A Herstory-
Making Event, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1970, at SM4.
34. 29 U.S.C §§ 2601-2654 (2000).
35. This movement's legal arm is exemplified by the WorkLife Law Center at University of
California Hastings College of the Law, whose webpage is available at
http://www.uchastings.edu/?pid=3624 (last visited Apr. 16, 2007).
36. See supra note 28.
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challenge to a new feminism is to make sense of those two desires and
unite them.
37
Another section in the book where we see some passion is Mansfield's
critique of science as inadequate to the task of understanding qualities like
manliness and womanliness. 38 This section of the book actually has some
sentences in it that are not incorrect. Mansfield is right that if we are concerned
with exploring a quality such as personality, especially archetypal personality,
the value of science may be limited by its compulsion to dissect that quality.
We can learn a great deal from art and literature about what human qualities
and virtues are worthy of our aspirations and idealism.
But Mansfield's analyses of cultural depictions of the manliness ideal fall
flat. Mansfield draws on works such as Ernest Hemingway's The Old Man and
the Sea39 and Henry James's The Bostonians, as well as popular icons such as
41John Wayne. Unfortunately, his readings of these texts and icons are tortuous,
not very compelling or illuminating, and, ultimately, too boring to justify the
time he spends on them. Though his reading of Hemingway is not bad, nothing
in his reading of The Bostonians, for instance, convinced me that the
subordination of women Mansfield argues it valorizes is something anyone
should aspire to. Most importantly, his analyses don't give the reader the
feeling that the works examined speak any deep truth, even though the purpose
of drawing on these works is to get to a deeper truth than science can. In any
case, it's clear that for Mansfield the concept of manliness is an archetype, an
ideal provided content in no small part by human culture and genius.
But feminism's critique of essentialized gender and gender roles
acknowledges and even makes a point of the fact that gendered roles,
archetypes, and virtues are pervasive in our literature and culture. Feminism
argues that they are nevertheless untrue and unjust. For cultural or difference
feminists, the literature and culture might be said to unjustly (and untruly) give
too little value to female archetypes. For liberal feminists, literature and culture
might be said to unjustly (and untruly) associate these virtues with biological
sex. For radical feminists like Catharine MacKinnon, literature and culture
might be said to unjustly (and untruly) make virtues of things that are not
virtues at all, like the exertion of power and violence over others. Thus,
pointing out appearances of the archetype of manliness in literature and culture
does not adequately respond to the feminist concern that the way we have been
37. MANSFIELD, supra note 4, at 240-41 (emphasis added). For Mansfield, the term "radical
feminism" is most essentially represented by Beauvoir, not by MacKinnon or Adrienne Rich or other
such radical feminists. For Mansfield, radical feminism appears to mean pro-sex existentialist/Marxist
feminism, which includes Beauvoir, Shulamith Firestone, and perhaps some postmodemist feminists.
38. Id. at 37-38.
39. Id. at 51-55.
40. Id. at 127-3 1.
41. Id. at 17.
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doing things and arranging things is deeply unjust and needs to change, even
though these practices are deeply ingrained.
Mansfield moves from his discussion of manly and womanly
characteristics to a critique of existentialism. This critique is targeted at setting
up his claim that we need some social roles rooted in our nature, some guide
from nature, or we risk falling into an evil nihilism whose only guiding
42principle is the will to power. By nature, Mansfield does not mean
biologically determined traits. For Mansfield, man's nature (manly) and
woman's nature (womanly) are part natural animal, part modified and
controlled animal. Nature is something that works in cooperation and in
conflict with nurture, says Mansfield, and cannot be separated from it. Nature,
it seems, includes human construction and the exercise of human will.
43
By defining nature in this way, Mansfield makes more plausible his claim
that manliness and womanliness, which he has described as something like
archetypal personalities, are "natural." As Mansfield defines it, "natural"
includes human construction, so the claim that an ideal like manliness, drawn
from literature and film, is "naturally" male is not so preposterous.
But how does the claim that manliness is "naturally" male, in this sense of
natural, provide support for the thesis that we should impose social norms
requiring males to act manly and females to act womanly? It doesn't, and this is
just one of numerous problems in Mansfield's book. When manliness is defined
as a combination of human will and art with animal instincts, we imagine it,
including its connection to being male, differently. Ideals and archetypes are
hard to change, but they do change. Thus, "natural" ideals, as Mansfield
describes them, are clearly contestable and modifiable.44
While Mansfield emphasizes at points that human nature as he is using the
term includes human construction, he then slips into the more common usage
of nature as a deterministic force. If it's natural for men to be manly, then they
should be expected to be manly because we can't defy nature.4 5
Of course we can defy nature if nature is human construction and
transformation of animal instinct, but we can't transcend nature simply because
it is human construction. Human constructions are just as real as animal
instincts and probably more often represent relevant constraints on our social
42. Id. at 190.
43. "What is needed is... a nature that leaves humans free to choose and a nurture that can cite a
reason for the choice made .... Hence nature must be seen as the guide for nurture." Id. at 202; see also
id. at 213 ("Nature is pliable as well as inescapable.").
44. Id. at 215-16 ("Insofar as nature is merely spontaneous, men transcend nature .... but in doing
so they use nature as a guide,... and they impose their interpretation on nature as well as on their
society. Nature allows itself to be understood as a whole in partisan interpretations, variously, and by
regimes.").
45. E.g., id. at 228 ("[R]epressing the difference won't work because manliness is in our nature and
cannot be repressed.").
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lives. We can, however, modify nature, disrupt it, and defy it if it is human
construction. (And even if it's not, given the right technology.) On the other
hand, if nature really is something that cannot be disrupted, remade, and
reformed (however difficult and unpredictable the process), then the claim that
the archetype of manliness described by Mansfield and depicted in literature
and culture is "natural" seems preposterous.
In any case, Mansfield positions manliness as an embattled virtue, one that
our "gender-neutral society" has been seeking to eradicate but which cannot be
eradicated. In this view, manliness continues to rear its irritating head and pose
problems for the gender neutral society because it is natural for men to be
manly. Few women are very manly, according to Mansfield, though some can
be,4 6 and though it appears, given his idea of manliness, that very few men have
ever been truly manly, either.
47
Why would manliness pose a problem for the gender-neutral society?
Couldn't the qualities of manliness simply be accessible to both males and
females? The answer is not what you might think. Mansfield does not mean
that men exhibit more manliness than women do, and that this poses a constant
experiential challenge to our belief in the lack of significant differences
between men and women. For Mansfield, the key manner in which manliness
threatens gender neutrality is that manliness includes misogyny.
48
Subordination of women is an unavoidable part of manliness for Mansfield, one
that men can't shake, because they can't defy their nature. For Mansfield, it is
manly to look down on women's work precisely because it is work done by
women. It is manly to look down on and seek to dominate women.
49
How exactly does this misogyny evidence itself even in the gender-neutral
society, according to Mansfield? I would have thought the prevalence of rape
and domestic violence were the most telling evidence that men, even in the
"gender-neutral society," still think of women as lesser beings.5" But
apparently, the real problem for the gender-neutral society is men's evasion of
46. Margaret Thatcher is repeatedly mentioned as an examplar of manliness. Id. at 11, 12, 69, 80,
152.
47. Some of the primary attributes of manliness according to Mansfield are confidence, ability to
command, independence, in control in risky situations, aloofness, assertiveness, assumption of authority,
stubbornness, and willingness to justify one's causes and actions in politics. Id. at 16-17, 71. "John
Wayne is still every American's idea of manliness. That tells you something about the standing of
manliness because John Wayne is not of our generation; in fact, he's dead." Id. at 17.
48. Id. at 13.
49. Id. at 7-8, 13,21.
50. These, like gay, lesbian, and bisexual existence, are topics that Mansfield mystifyingly leaves
untreated in his plea for more stringent gender roles. The mentions of rape are few-mostly offhand
remarks, having nothing to do with male power, about the reason men don't understand "no." (They are
apparently confused about whether a woman is being modest.) Id. at 155. One of the few mentions of
queer existence comes when Mansfield refers to "the gays and lesbians" as imitators of heterosexual
marriage, whose unions require "compensat[ion] for the missing qualities of the other sex," and
therefore lack the ideal gender balance of heterosexual marriage. Id. at 242.
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their equal share of housework.5 1 Laziness is an odd way for woman-deriding,
physically superior, direct, assertive manliness to present itself, but this is what
Mansfield posits. He argues that men don't like to do housework because they
look down on it as women's work. This feeling of superiority is accommodated
because, as an element of manliness, it is only natural. Perhaps mentioning rape
and domestic violence would have made far too clear that not all that is
"naturally" male, in the sense of culturally idealized and associated with males,
should be accommodated and encouraged.
As if recognizing that all of this is really not convincing, Mansfield stops
well short of what would seem to be the implications of his view that the
"natural" traits of womanliness and manliness should guide us. Mansfield says
that we cannot return to the formal legal inequality of a prior day, and have to
instead settle for public equality and private inequality, as a means of
"employing" manliness, now unemployed. 2 By this he seems not to mean that
married women should not be allowed to form contracts, or that men should be
allowed to rape and beat their wives, simply because this all occurs in
"private." (Although he doesn't necessarily not mean that, either.) "Public" to
Mansfield appears to include any treatment of sex as a formal matter before the
law. And before the law, he grudgingly concedes, women must now be equal to
men, period. 3 What Mansfield really seems to mean is that we should raise
boys and girls in gendered ways, but leave a few headstrong exceptions free as
a formal legal matter to deviate from those gender roles if they insist.
54
It is not explained how gender roles serve as any kind of sensible guide for
boys, girls, men, and women, when law promotes a gender-neutral set of
norms. How are men to treat women as equals at work if "nature" dictates that
they treat them as subordinates at home? How are we to pander to the
supposedly "natural" need of men to "feel important,"5 5 while insisting that
they not rape and beat those who make them feel unimportant, including their
wives? Mansfield claims in earlier chapters of his book that he wants to resist
scientific dissection of the manliness archetype. He rejects the possibility of
throwing out isolated pieces of manliness, like the gender hierarchy and sex
roles it embraces. But in the final chapters of his book, Mansfield picks and
chooses with impunity. What is going on?
51. Id. at 7-8, 13, 21, 32-33.
52. Id. at 229, 237, 241.
53. Id. at 241.
54. See id. at 243 ("[O]ur public education tries to get boys to play with dolls, and girls to play
with.., no, for some reason not guns. A better education would make children and grown-ups more
aware of themselves, and it would be franker and less manipulative than what we attempt now."). He
also includes some strange comments that I can only call "awkward dating advice" at the start of his
concluding chapter. Id. at 229 ("1 could tell young women not to disparage motherhood in the hearing of
a man they want to attract .... I could tell young men that women want to be taken seriously almost as
much as they want to be loved.").
55. Id. at 21.
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Perhaps Mansfield knows he doesn't have what it takes to convince anyone
in the political realm, so instead he hopes to slowly erode our norms of gender
equality in private, until eventually political support for formal legal oppression
of women gathers force. In this attempt to indirectly accomplish what he cannot
accomplish through honest argument, his book is exceedingly "womanly," in a
rather negative sense of the term.
In sum, Manliness is a very boring book. Those rare points that are correct
are neither original nor particularly well-put, and require slogging through
numerous tiresome and unconvincing assertions. Throughout, the book
obfuscates its position to no seeming purpose, and ends on a most un-"manly"
note. Feminism could use a better rejoinder than this.
II. TROUBLE FOR FEMINISM
While Mansfield misses them, there are real problems and inadequacies in
feminist theory. In this part, I provide what I think is a fairer problematization
of feminist theories, especially postmodem feminism, that maintain that gender
is largely socially constructed and therefore not essential.
A. Optimistically Transcending Gender
Simone de Beauvoir was an existentialist. 56 The notion that objects and
things are indifferent to the human and the significance the human places upon
them is crucial to this way of thinking. This is a picture of human experience as
a difficult and painful confrontation with the fact that one has freedom to act
and engage with the world. Another concept fundamental to Beauvoir's way of
thinking is that existence precedes essence; man is not a natural species, but
rather a historical idea.57 As she famously put it, "One is not bom, but rather
becomes, a woman;" 58 biological differences are irrelevant outside of the social
relevance given to them. This is a rejection of the body's importance outside of
a social context. One cannot be conscious of oneself except as a social being.
59
Beauvoir also accepts the psychoanalytic idea that one defines oneself
through exclusion and negation of the Other. In other words, one thinks of
oneself as individual by distinguishing the Other. Beauvoir fits the oppression
of women into this picture by positing that they are the ultimate Other.
Normally, one must distinguish oneself from the Other in order to recognize
56. E.g., H.M. Parshley, Translator's Note, in SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX xxxviii
(H.M. Parshley trans., Vintage Books 1989) (1949).
57. Id. at 53 ("Humanity is not an animal species, it is a historical reality.").
58. Id. at 267.
59. Id. at 36-37 ("[W]e must view the facts of biology in the light of ontological, economic, social,
and psychological context .... [Tihere is no true living reality except as manifested by the conscious
individual through activities and in the bosom of a society.").
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one's own liberty. One then seeks to dominate and subjugate the Other. But
when the other person is revealed to be a consciousness, one must recognize
that this other person also has liberty. Women are the ultimate Other that is
used to resolve this problem; women are given the status of an Other that is not
cold and indifferent like objects, but is still not really another person. Woman is
"a conscious being" yet "it seems possible to possess her in the flesh., 61
So what happens when even women, the ultimate Other, assert themselves
and try to establish their sovereignty? Beauvoir says that they seek to dominate
men as a form of self-defense, and men resist this.62 Beauvoir describes a
complex power relation between men and women. The object seeks to use its
submission as power over the subject. 63 Both sexes then become victims of
each other and themselves. 64 But Beauvoir promotes another option: women
simply asserting their own equality and existent nature, without seeking to
dominate men. Beauvoir acknowledges certain pleasures in the power dynamic
between man and his Other, but she says the pleasures can be sacrificed
because they come at the cost of "blood or misery." 65 Her utopian vision of
sexual relations between men and women is far from perfect, and is
homophobic,66 but this sounds anything but nihilist.
Rather, Beauvoir argues that when we abandon the idea that there is a
natural law that constrains our freedom and tells us what to do, we must then
confront our terrifying freedom and figure out what to do on our own. This
does not inexorably lead to guidance by the will to power, and did not for
Beauvoir, but she did choose an overly simplistic and ultimately dissatisfying
answer for what we should do: Women should assert their liberty, and men
should respond to that assertion by recognizing the liberty of women. Men
themselves would be liberated in this recognition of women's liberty, she
argues-liberated from the task of continual subordination and repression of
67women's assertions of liberty. She expresses a faith that "liberty can break the
circle."
68
60. Id. at 139-140, 141.
61. Id. at 141.
62. Id. at 717.
63. Id. at 718.
64. Id. at 718-19.
65. Id. at 729-30.
66. Beauvoir's main discussion of lesbianism is tolerant. It analyzes lesbianism as a reaction to
women's subordination, but concludes that it is "[]ike all human behavior," and simply "one way,
among others, in which woman solves the problems posed by her condition in general, her erotic
situation in particular." Id. at 424. Yet in describing how women could be free if boys and girls were
raised as equals, in coeducational settings, Beauvoir notes that other systems create "repressions,
obsessions, [and] neuroses." She argues that "[tihe excessive sentimentality, homosexual fervors, and
platonic crushes of adolescent girls, . . . are much more injurious than a little childish sex play." Id. at
726-27.
67. Id. at 720.
68. Id. at 728.
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Of course, even if gender is socially constructed, that doesn't necessarily
make it easy to "transcend." In this, Mansfield is right to critique Beauvoir,
69
but not very original. Postmodern thinkers, while abandoning the notion of
natural law and essences, give focus to the fact that we are still constrained by
social constructions. Social constructions aren't essential, but they are very
real. You can't transcend what has made you, whether or not it involves human
construction. And in seeking to transcend gender, you inevitably define
yourself with reference to gender, in reaction to it.70 Thus, the response of
many postmodernists has been to valorize strategies that disrupt identity, rather
than seeking to transcend it.
71
Even the postmodern strategy, however, begs the question of what that
disruption is in the service of, as I discuss in Section II.C. Society, especially
one that wants freedom, needs constraints and ethics.72 Being an animal isn't
being free in the human sense. An overly simplistic notion of transcendent
liberty fails to suggest what those constraints should be, or how people should
discover them. It fails to define the self. In my reading, Beauvoir does not
promote a freedom in which there is no morality or ethics other than one's own
desire for power. Far from it. But she does fail to say what goes in place of
natural law, or to give a realistic prescription of how to disrupt gender
essentialism.
B. Radical Feminists
Radical feminists like MacKinnon, whom Mansfield mentions only in the
bibliography, do in fact provide a prescription for change. MacKinnon, like
Beauvoir, sees gender as socially constructed. The definitions of man and
woman are precise: a subject-man-who fucks, and an object-woman-who
gets fucked.73 To be subordinated is to be a woman by definition.
But MacKinnon takes a less naive approach than does Beauvoir, seeing any
"transcendence" of gender as incredibly difficult to accomplish. In this view,
women cannot simply be liberated by saying so, to enjoy sexuality on equal and
free terms. In fact, MacKinnon argues that sexuality would look so different in
a world without gender subordination that we can't even conceive of it.
74
69. MANSFIELD, supra note 4, at 159-60.
70. See BUTLER, supra note 2, at 44, 95, 119.
71. See id. at 174-80.
72. Seidman, supra note 3, at 129.
73. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 124 (1989).
74. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7
SIGNS 515, 534 (1982), reprinted in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDATIONS 437, 447 (D. Kelly
Weisberg ed., 1993) ("if women are socially defined such that female sexuality.., is its own lack, then
there is no such thing as a woman as such .... For feminism, asking whether there is, socially, a female
sexuality is the same as asking whether women exist.").
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But she does not seem to argue that there is no reality, no truth, or no
nature to guide us. Rather, she argues that because we have been so corrupted
by the social construction of gender, we can't even see it right now. The first
goal, then, is to get past gender subordination. How do we explode the false
system of gender subordination and power relations in order to move on to
constructing good lives? Through consciousness-raising of women, 75 as well as
through specific causes of action that give women the power to speak the harm
that has been done to them by gender subordination and recover for it.7
6
Mansfield seems to think that consciousness-raising means ridding our
vocabulary of gendered words and the like,77 but it also has meant women
coming together in groups to speak about the harm and injury of rape-an issue
Mansfield largely ignores-issues they had been so long forbidden to discuss.
Rather than trusting the state's criminal law, or any top-down state action,
to undo women's subordination, MacKinnon chose civil lawsuits, which by
their nature are more grassroots because they are attached to and directed by
victims' claims of injury. Her approach avoids the need for top-down reform,
which is inevitably poisoned by the system of gender subordination itself.
78
Moreover, avoiding a top-down prescription avoids the need to find a
justification for that prescription in any essential law or nature. The anti-
pornography ordinance MacKinnon drafted with Andrea Dworkin, for instance,
did not outlaw pornography directly as an immoral or unnatural practice.79
Rather, it gave individual women civil rights claims that would give them the
power to speak the harm that pornography did to them and to recover.
Pornographers would have to pay because they injured actual women who
complained, not because they defied natural law or some other moral system.
Why should we listen to those women's claims of injury? For MacKinnon,
it is because women have special access to the system of gender subordination
we hope to explode, precisely because they are victim subjects who have been
constructed by it.80 But of course, men, too, have been constructed by a system
75. Id. at 536-37.
76. MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin drafted an antipornography ordinance for the City of
Minneapolis. CATHARINE A. MACKNNON, Francis Biddle's Sister: Pornography, Civil Rights, and
Speech, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987), reprinted in APPLICATIONS OF FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY TO
WOMEN'S LIVES: SEX, VIOLENCE, WORK AND REPRODUCTION 59 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1996).
MacKinnon was also on the brief for the plaintiff in Meritor Savings Bank FSB v. Vinson, which held
that both quid pro quo and hostile work environment forms of sexual harassment violate Title VII. 477
U.S. 57 (1986).
77. E.g., MANSFIELD, supra note 4, at 123, 212.
78. Andrea Dworkin, Against the Male Flood: Censorship, Pornography, and Equality, 8 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 1,22-23 (1985) ("The civil rights law does not force the pornography back underground.
There is no prior restraint or police power to make arrests .... The civil rights law is women's speech.
It defines an injury to us from our point of view.").
79. "We define pornography as... a violation of women's civil rights .... [The] point [of the
ordinance] is to hold those who profit from and benefit from that injury accountable to those who are
injured. It means that women's injury-our damage, our pain, our enforced inferiority-should
outweigh their pleasure and their profits .... " MACKINNON, supra note 76, at 59.
80. MacKinnon, supra note 74, at 536-37.
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of gender subordination. And special access or no, not all women think the
same way.
As a result, MacKinnon's project against pornography was deeply
unsatisfying even to many whose interest was not in the subordination of
women.81 Her project against sexual harassment has come under sincere attack
82from queer theory as well. Despite the facial appeal of civil actions as a kind
of grassroots reform mechanism, they do in fact permit some women to speak
for others in the form of class actions, injunctive remedies, and industry-
crippling monetary damages. If one woman can obtain an injunction or
monetary damages against the production of pornographic material, or against
telling crude and degrading jokes at work, she can prevent all women and men
from accessing that material, profiting from it, or being a part of it.
What one woman views as degradation and harm, another views as
sexually pleasing. And if we have all been constructed by gender
subordination, then why listen to some women over others? MacKinnon's
answer to this diversity of perception among women was false consciousness,
8 3
which needed raising. The idea that we all have false consciousnesses might
not have been so difficult to accept. But of course, with consciousness-raising,
the implication is that someone is doing the raising. This does not feel like a
revolution of the people, who are women. This still feels like top-down reform,
and so the question looms: From where does one get these prescriptions for
social and legal reforms, and what makes them right?
C. Embracing Trouble
Postmodern feminists have learned a great deal from the pitfalls of
Beauvoir and MacKinnon's approaches, and have taken extremely seriously the
viewpoint that all our desires and wishes are constructed and coerced by
various loci of power. In their view, there is no such thing as "free" action
outside the context of coercion. "Freedom" is just as naive a term as
"transcendence. 84
Rather than seeking to transcend or explode the social construction of
gender (and other social constructions), postmodem feminists promote the
81. E.g., Nan D. Hunter & Sylvia A. Law, Brief Amici Curiae of Feminist Anti-Censorship
Taskforce, et al., in American Booksellers Association v. Hudnut, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 69 (1987).
82. See, e.g., Janet Halley, Sexuality Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW
182 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004).
83. "[W]omen are socialized to passive receptivity; may have or perceive no alternative to
acquiescence ... Some women eroticize dominance and submission; it beats feeling forced."
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Rape: On Coercion and Consent, in TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE
STATE, supra note 73, at 171, 177.
84. See, e.g., I MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 159 (Robert Hurley trans.,
Vintage Books 1990) (1976) ("[L]et us ponder all the ruses that were employed for centuries to make us
love sex ... the stratagems by which we were induced to apply all our skills to discovering its secrets
.... The irony of this deployment is in having us believe that our 'liberation' is in the balance.").
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disruption of identity.85 In this regard, they share an affinity with Mansfield,
though one gets the sense he would not like to admit it. Mansfield asserts,
citing to Aristotle, that manliness is "both within nature and asserted against
nature.. . .Assertiveness is what makes manliness 'transcendent,' to use
Beauvoir's word in a more adequate way than she . ,86 He finds this manly
transcendence virtuous.
Though postmodern theory has rejected the simplistic idea that cultural
constructs can be transcended (in the sense of ignored and escaped), like
Beauvoir, postmodem theory does not provide any morality or ethics that these
disruptive assertions serve. Nor does Mansfield do this for manliness. For
Mansfield, manliness can be in the service of all kinds of potential moralities.
It is "neutral between good and evil.''  He does, in fact, propose a specific
guide for human life: men should act manly and women should act womanly.
8 8
But manliness itself, the rehabilitation of which the book purports to take as its
purpose,89 does not necessarily serve gender roles. After all, as Mansfield
repeatedly affirms, the modem feminist movement was itself manly, and, in his
view, helped abolish gender roles. There is no good connection between the
rehabilitation of manliness and the rehabilitation of a dual gender system,
loosely tied to biological sex.
9 0
As Seidman has explained in an illuminating history of queer theory's
development, "to the extent ... that poststructural critique ... [has become] a
politics of the disruptive gesture, it lacks coherence." 91 "Underlying this
politics of subversion is a vague notion that this will encourage new,
affirmative forms of personal and social life, although poststructuralists are
reluctant to name their social vision. 92 Seidman sees this as an "implicit[ly]"
"anarchistic championing of 'pure' freedom from all constraints and limits '93-
not too dissimilar from the "nihilism" to which Mansfield claims eradicating
gender roles leads.
But to draw this implication so quickly is not quite fair. Firm opposition to
a rigid role or identity may not necessarily equate to extreme forms of
individualistic libertarianism and anarchism, or even nihilism. Postmodem
theorists are not inspired by Nietzche and Foucault alone. They are also
85. See BUTLER, supra note 2, at 174-80.
86. MANSFIELD, supra note 4, at 216.
87. Id. at x, xii.
88. Id. at 244.
89. Id. at ix-x.
90. Without much explanation at all, Mansfield submits to eradication of gender roles under the
law, in what he deems the public sphere, but insists on dual, complementary gender roles in the private
sphere. This is why I call his dual gender system "loosely" tied to biological sex.
91. Seidman, supra note 3, at 135.
92. Id. at 132.
93. Id. at 133.
2007]
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
inspired to end injustice against women, people of color, and queers.94 A better
reading perhaps is that the postmodernists and queer theorists are in favor of
ethics and morals, but have the humility to realize that an appropriate ethics and
morality is contingent on the society we currently inhabit. We simply should
not assume that any particular ethics or morality is fixed by natural law for all
time. 95 So they limit themselves to exposing the fact that these social roles,
moralities, and ethical rules are ones we choose, that we bear responsibility for,
and that are therefore always subject to contest.
For example, Judith Butler clearly acknowledges that there is a "political
necessity to use some sign now." Some identity, some role, is necessary. It's
necessary for justice. She simply asks for avowal of the "the sign's strategic
provisionality" in order that "future significations of the sign not be
foreclosed.' '96 It doesn't seem that Butler is implying that identity is the root of
evil, but rather that the naturalization of identity is.
Of course, she's still not telling us which identities, roles, norms, and
ethical rules are the right ones for now; that doesn't seem to be part of her
project. So there is a looming question: What's the point? Here is the trouble
for postmodern feminism: Simply embracing the idea of trouble doesn't satisfy.
The problem with feminism is that we don't yet have a system for determining
the concrete political implications of postmodern theory, not that postmodern
and feminist theorists are unwittingly advocating anarchy.
III. POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS
So can we have guiding principles for how to live a basically human life
without resort to "nature"? Mansfield asserts that we cannot, but there have in
fact been good efforts to do just this. Martha Nussbaum, for instance, promotes
the protection of "capabilities," leaving space for people to do what they will
with those capabilities, and provides room for variation in what constitutes a
truly human life.97 But even this still feels somewhat like universalism.
I believe that we can construct rights while acknowledging their
contingency. We can create legal constructions that protect room for
reconstruction of social and legal norms themselves. Speech is an obvious such
94. In her Preface to the 1999 edition of Gender Trouble, Butler explains, "I grew up understanding
something of the violence of gender norms .... The writing of this denaturalization was not done
simply out of a desire to play with language or prescribe theatrical antics in the place of 'real'
politics .... It was done from a desire to live, to make life possible .... BUTLER, supra note 2, at xx.
95. Katharine Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L.R. 829, 880 (1990) ("Positionality is
a stance from which a number of apparently inconsistent feminist 'truths' make sense. The positional
stance acknowledges the existence of empirical truths, values and knowledge, and also their
contingency.").
96. Judith Butler, Imitation and Gender Insubordination, in THE LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES
READER 307, 311-12 (Henry Abelove et al. eds., 1993).
97. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (2001).
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right, which is thought to protect our ability to reason about and change what
we think matters. But other rights can also protect agency in the construction of
identity, the self, and norms of what it means to be human. These are rights
such as the right to control one's own body, freedom of dress, and rights to
education, and workplace liberties.
We cannot eradicate social norms and roles, and we shouldn't want to. But
demands for justice and claims of equality by numerous classes of subordinated
persons, including women, should teach us that we need a society that
preserves space for contesting those norms and roles-for troubling them.
Without that space, we become a static, oppressive society, resistant to change,
guided by orthodoxy. Yes, we need identities, but identities should be things
we take part in reforming and reconstructing, not rigid stereotypes that limit our
possibilities.
98
Instead of stopping with the promotion of "troubling" those identities, legal
scholars are situated to go further. We should do something about the fact that
most people don't have the legal right to be troublemakers in the first place.
Dressing in drag might trouble gender identity, but the usefulness of that
prescription is limited for someone who will lose her job, be kicked out of
school, or be sent to jail for doing so. That is why I have, previously, provided
a normative argument for recognizing a freedom of dress.
9 9
In other words, despite its refusal to embrace a permanent, universal guide
for living a good life, postmodern theory can still have a point-at least for law.
The point is that we should protect, via legal constructs such as rights, the
capacity to experiment with, challenge, and trouble social norms and roles.
These rights do not have to be constants in order to be important. For example,
freedom of dress is, today, in capitalist America especially, a crucial freedom
for the formation and re-formation of identity.1° But it may not be in some
cultures, and it may not be forever.
In other words, Butler promotes gender trouble, rather than freedom from
gender. But there is a further project of recognizing why gender trouble is
normatively good; what is it in the service of, if not eradicating gender? My
guess as to why the concept of gender trouble has appealed to so many is that
we recognize contestation of our received wisdom and social roles as
normatively good. Being able to participate in our own self-definition is a large
part of what it means to be human, and gender trouble is an example of such
active participation. But once we recognize the value of contest and
participation, we should act in concrete ways to protect the freedom to engage
98. 1 have made this argument previously. Gowni Ramachandran, Freedom of Dress: State and
Private Regulation of Clothing, Hairstyle, Jewelry, Makeup, Tattoos, and Piercing, 66 MD. L. REV. 11,
32 (2006).
99. See id.
100. See id. at 40-44.
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in it. While freedom from gender may be a false hope, freedom to be a gender
troublemaker need not be.
Review: The Devil Wears Prada and Working Girl:
Sympathy for the Devil
Judith P. Miller
t
Miranda Priestly (Meryl Streep), the eponymous "Devil" in the roman
clef, The Devil Wears Prada, is "the most powerful woman in publishing."'
Yet, as the movie makes plain, it is the work of the women behind the woman
that makes her success possible. Assistants Andy Sachs (Anne Hathaway) and
Emily (Emily Blunt) are professional wives, picking up-and in some cases
picking up after-Miranda's dry-cleaning, dog, children, breakfast, coat,
coffee, and (signature Hermes) scarves. Andy arranges parent-teacher
conferences and calls caterers-all at a moment's notice, at any time of day or
night, and with little in the way of thanks or encouragement. Focusing on
Andy, the movie seems a conventional coming-of-age story: nai've Midwestern
young woman graduates from college, moves to New York, loses her moral
compass under the seductive influence of a wordly new job, then comes to her
senses in time to reclaim her true self (a journalist) at the end of the movie.
Under this reading, Miranda is little more than yet another iteration of the
dragon-lady boss, a cinematic stock character echoing, most notably, Katharine
Parker (Sigourney Weaver) of Working Girl,2 but with roots deep in the history
of cinema.3 Yet although Andy may well come of age, Miranda is no stock
type, twisted by the cost of her success in a man's world. Indeed, it is precisely
her contrast with cinema's Katharine Parkers, who epitomize femininity
perverted by the workplace,4 that makes the film so remarkable. While both
films betray a popular culture's ambivalence toward women's success in the
t Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2008; Yale University, Ph.D. in Political Science expected 2011; Yale
College, B.A. 2003. I would like to thank William Baude, Amelia Hoover, Carrie Pagnucco, and Vicki
Schultz.
1. The film, The Devil Wears Prada, (Twentieth Century Fox 2006) [hereinafter PRADA], is based
on a thinly veiled recounting of Lauren Weisberger's time as an assistant to the famously prickly Anna
Wintour, editor-in-chief of Vogue magazine. LAUREN WEISBERGER, THE DEVIL WEARS PRADA (Anchor
Books 2006) (2003).
2. WORKING GIRL (Twentieth Century Fox 1988).
3. See, e.g., ALL ABOUT EVE (Twentieth Century Fox 1950) (depicting Margo Channing's (Bette
Davis) relationship with an ambitious young star who wants to replace Channing).
4. Cf SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR ON AMERICAN WOMEN at xx-xxiii, 1-
226 (Anchor Books 1992) (1991) (arguing that media portrayals of feminism as responsible for
women's problems should be understood as attempts to re-entrench those values threatened by the
women's movement's successes).
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workplace, the movies' strikingly different frameworks for their protagonists'
travails illustrate a genuine transformation: Where Working Girl obsesses over
a token woman's feminine failures, The Devil Wears Prada revalues women's
work by treating women's participation in the workplace as unremarkable.
As Rosabeth Moss Kanter explains in her ground-breaking Men and
Women of the Corporation,5 firms' constructions of the workplace-
particularly the structure of incentives, disincentives, and opportunities-in
turn construct work as gendered. That is, as opportunities to enter the
workplace open in a sex-segregated fashion, and the workplace itself
reproduces sex segregation, those inhabiting different subdivisions of the
workplace then strive for success in their segmented job sectors. These varying
job tracks cause employees to emphasize and develop precisely those skills
leading to success in their area but, due to the nature of the job structures, not
the workplace as a whole. Because workers classify other workers by sex rather
than position in the workplace, this self-entrenching sex-segregation reproduces
and even strengthens itself into "women's" and "men's" jobs where job
characteristics are subsumed into naturalized sexes. Breaking out of these pink-
collar ghettoes does not, all on its own, end the effects of this segregation. To
the contrary, the faux-integration of small numbers of women can leave them
"tokens" in an overwhelmingly male workplace. Kanter observes that, in such
workplaces, women frequently ease the difficulties they encounter by adopting
(or being treated as) a "type": conventionally, "mother," "seductress," "pet,"
and "iron maiden."
6
Kanter's explanation easily encompasses Katharine Parker: The only
managerial woman we see in the world of finance she inhabits, Katharine, like
Miranda Priestly, is brought to viewers' attention through her increasingly
exploitative treatment of her secretary/personal assistant, Tess McGill (Melanie
Griffith). The movie's viewers are led to believe that Katharine claws her way
to middle management through her feminine wiles, a true "woman of the
corporation." Responding to colleagues' and superiors' sexual come-ons, she
parries their remarks with her own flirtatious responses, acting at once the
token making the best of a sexualized situation beyond her control and the
seductress using her sexuality for career advancement. As she summarizes to
Tess, "Today's junior prick is tomorrow's senior partner."7 Indeed, Tess
believes Katharine takes her and her ambitions seriously because, as Tess
explains to her boyfriend, "Katharine is a woman. There's none of that chasing
around the desk crap. And it's like, she wants to be my mentor, which is
exactly what I needed!"8
5. ROSABETH Moss KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION (2d ed. 1993).
6. Id. at 233-36.
7. WORKING GIRL, supra note 2.
8. Id.
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For Katharine, it is this inviting-thisfeminine-persona which gives her a
leg up in an otherwise uninviting workplace. Katharine succeeds precisely
because of her success in turning her weapon of the weak9-namely, her
femininity-against her environment, taking advantage of Tess by softening
her domineering requests with girlish flirtation. She opens her deepest betrayal
by, first, coquettishly revealing to Tess her plans to marry her long-time
boyfriend and colleague, Jack Trainer (Harrison Ford). Only then, after
invoking this intimacy, does Katharine explain to Tess that the business deal
Tess suggested to Katharine-a business deal which could launch Tess out of
her dead-end secretarial pool and into a management position-won't work. As
Tess discovers later, Katharine has actually decided to carry out the deal
herself, stealing Tess's idea and its concomitant opportunity for career
advancement.
This exploitation through feminine intimacy is Katharine's modus
operandi. One can only imagine the hostility Katharine would have
encountered from a world of Jack Trainers had she been less of a "seductress."
As Jack puts it, on meeting Tess, "You're the first woman I've seen [at a
business function] ... that dresses like a woman, not like a woman thinks a
man would dress if he was a woman." 1° That is, even Jack-the boyfriend of
the only publicly successful woman in the movie (and the unwitting accomplice
to Tess's business machinations)-sees women in business as women vis-a-vis
their femininity, and Katharine is no fool to try to turn that sex-stereotyping to
her advantage. The real-world figure of Ann Hopkins-told, after she was
denied promotion, that she needed to "walk more femininely, talk more
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and
wear jewelry"1 1 if she wanted a promotion-provides all the cautionary
warnings the Katharine Parkers of the world need. Parker is thus not just one
"bad apple." She represents, rather, the cumulative consequences of rational
responses to a sex-segregated workplace where Kanter-like gender roles "help"
ambitious women navigate toward successful careers.
While Miranda Priestly certainly does not hesitate to use her subordinates
for her own purposes, she does not rely on intimacy to extract their labor.
Rather, she offers a bargain: one year of servitude in the form of standard
wifework in exchange for a future of the subordinate's choosing. Like
Katharine Parker, Miranda asks Andy to perform a series of humiliating
errands, but, unlike Parker, she never demands Andy do them out of love. The
cultural anxiety the genre reflects thus shifts from women in the workplace to
the workplace itself
9. Cf JAMES C. SCOTT, WEAPONS OF THE WEAK: EVERYDAY FORMS OF PEASANT RESISTANCE
(1987) (documenting and explaining forms of everyday rebellion by the weak against those with
material power who also believe themselves to hold hegemonic power).
10. WORKING GIRL, supra note 2.
11. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989) (internal citations omitted).
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Andy would disagree with this assessment. In Miranda's defense, Andy
exclaims, "If [Miranda] were a man, the only thing people would talk about is
how good she is at her job!, 12 Yet, particularly in contrast to Katharine Parker,
Miranda's womanhood does not seem particularly relevant to her workplace-
shaped behavior. For instance, while Miranda's husband seeks divorce in
response to her work-induced absences, we learn that he too works a high-
powered job in politics but does manage to make time for his family. And,
indeed, the phenomenon of the executive spouse is a real one. As Kanter
discusses, men also rely on the labor of their unpaid spouses to bolster their
careers.13 So, too, while Miranda betrays an employee for her own advantage,
recommending that her rival move to a lucrative and exciting job in a new
company although her own employee had already been promised it, the
betrayal in no way relied on intimacy to function. Miranda is willing to step on
someone to get ahead-something she believes the workplace demands-but
power politics are not excluded from the bargains she seals. Indeed, there is
something refreshingly upfront about the way in which Miranda presents Andy
with the "opportunity" to betray Emily, the senior assistant. When Miranda
informs Andy that she has chosen Andy, not Emily, to go to the Paris fashion
shows (the movie's golden apple), Miranda makes Andy herself inform Emily
of the change. Miranda's methods for getting ahead-the tools she tries to
impart to Andy-are nasty, but they are not especially distinct from a
conventional account of the backstabbing world of corporate politics.
Miranda's only gendered variation on this corporate world is not feminine
but, rather, borderline feminist, as we see from her implicit bargain with Andy:
one year of professional wifework in exchange for entree into the world of
magazine journalism. And indeed, even after Andy walks off her job in a huff,
Miranda provides a winning recommendation: as recounted by Andy's
interviewer, "Of all the assistants she has ever had, you were by far her biggest
disappointment. And, if I don't hire you, I'm an idiot." 14 Miranda, who, as we
learned earlier in the movie, has come to "see a great deal of [her]self in
[Andy],"' 5 is indeed personally disappointed by Andy. Yet she still
recommends Andy for future work in terms no editor could afford to ignore
(given Miranda's power in the publishing world). Indeed, personal assistance to
Miranda, in spite of its utter detachment from actual journalism experience,
remains widely understood to qualify one for any journalism job.
12. PRADA, supra note ].
13. KANTER, supra note 5, at 104-26 (describing the role of corporate wives in their husbands'
careers). Of course, as many have noted, the relative social roles within an intimate relationship too are
gendered from within and without the relationship. See, e.g., RHONA MAHONEY, KIDDING OURSELVES
(1995) (outlining actions within relationships modeled on bargaining as a way of changing the relative
social roles of men and women in relationships).
14. PRADA, SUpra note 1.
15. Id.
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The Devil Wears Prada cleverly subverts the genre Working Girl typifies
by doing far more than merely meeting the low bar of evaluating a successful
woman without focusing on her gender. The film instead transforms the genre
of punishing uppity women for violating gender norms into a celebration of
ambition in women and a recognition of the real behind-the-scenes labor-
women's work-which enables the contemporary workplace. The movie
doesn't wear its feminist credentials on its sleeve but sneaks them in sub rosa,
subversion by iteration.
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INTRODUCTION
Janet Halley's new book, Split Decisions: How and Why to Take a Break
from Feminism, challenges us to learn to imagine, to theorize, to organize
outside of feminism, not to renounce or abandon it.' Such an effort will be
fruitful, according to Halley, on account of the power feminism now wields in
the constitution of life in the United States. For Halley, if feminism, and in
t Yale Law School, J.D. 2007; Cornell University, A.B. Adam is co-editor with Martha Fineman and
Jack Jackson of Strange Bedfellows?: An Uncomfortable Conversation in Feminist and Queer Legal
Theory (forthcoming 2007). Special thanks are due to Vicki Schultz, who provided very helpful
comments on two drafts; conversations with, and suggestions by, Kathy Abrams, Anne Alstott, Pamela
Bridgewater, Martha Fineman, Jack Jackson, Paul Kahn, Allegra McLeod, and Anna Marie Smith were
extremely useful; Erin Bradrick, Emily Chapuis, Ryan Gaglio, Sara Jeruss, Aarti Khanolkar, Judith
Miller, Eli Swiney, Vasudha Talla, Rebecca Webber, Michael Yarbrough, and the rest of the Yale
Journal of Law and Feminism membership were excellent editors.
I. See generally JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM
FEMINISM (2006).
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particular feminist theory, has come to help shape how we understand
experience, process information, evaluate circumstance, assign meaning, design
institutions, order society, economy, community, and intimacy, manage
emotion, and dream utopia, then it would be good on occasion to look critically
at the entire enterprise, to subject feminist assumptions, conceptions, and
aspirations to rigorous critique, to see what is there when feminism is not.
2
Halley's core argument is correct: the ideas and ideals upon and towards
which any feminist project-indeed, any project-proceeds must always be
subject to reconsideration, revision, and, perhaps, rejection. 3 As a scholar
concerned with the distribution and operation of power in society, I agree with
Halley that all sources and exercises of power must be interrogated, even if
ultimately approved of. Yet I cannot agree with the way Halley states her point,
for it is not necessary to take a break from feminism, as Halley urges, to be
4critical of or to work beyond feminist projects, as Halley desires. To be sure,
not only do feminist methodologies elide the substantive commitments of
which Halley is critical, they also demand and invite self-criticism. More
fundamentally, the construction of Halley's point mistakenly presumes the
existence of a readily, and easily, identifiable body of substantive thought
called "feminism" from which to take a break. Rather, like others before me, I
suggest the term "feminist," particularly when applied to legal theory, is best
understood as a methodological description.
In the context of Split Decisions, the inquiry into what feminism is raises
the question of what queer legal theory is, for Halley argues for a project that
takes a break from the former in favor of, it appears, the latter. Because "queer"
reflects a positionality vis-A-vis the normative, we cannot know what queer
2. See, e.g., id. at 8 ("If I'm right that feminism as it is practiced in the United States today is
dedicated to thinking in terms of male and female (masculine and feminine, etc.), noticing instances of
male power and female subordination, and working on behalf of subordinated female interests, we can
convert these aspirational and prescriptive commitments to hypotheses, and then take a break from them
and try to see other arrangements of m and f and other kinds of power."); see also Ian Halley, Queer
Theory by Men, II DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 7 (2004) (the author also publishes as Janet Halley)
[hereinafter Halley, Queer Theory by Men /]; Janet Halley, Queer Theory by Men, in STRANGE
BEDFELLOWS?: AN UNCOMFORTABLE CONVERSATION IN FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY
(Martha Albertson Fineman, Jack E. Jackson, & Adam P. Romero eds., forthcoming 2007) (manuscript
at 1, on file with author) [hereinafter Halley, Queer Theory by Men I1].
3. Cf ANNA MARIE SMITH, LACLAU AND MOUFFE: THE RADICAL DEMOCRATIC IMAGINARY 182
(1998) ("A space for permanent democratic dissent must therefore be built into the radical democratic
pluralist imaginary, for it is through contestation and struggle that exclusions can be brought to light and
new democratic institutions can be imagined and established.").
4. Halley seems to want to both work outside of feminism as well as to critique feminism.
However, there is a subtle, but important, difference to note: being without feminism or working outside
of it suggests an absence of feminism, whereas, on the other hand, critiquing feminism or being against
it requires feminism to remain very much present. Certainly Halley can argue for both types of projects
since they are not mutually exclusive. However, one wonders if Halley truly seeks a complete
suspension of feminism, since, as Part II argues, Halley advocates for arguably feminist methods
without predetermined substantive commitments. If that is true, what becomes clear-and what is
confirmed by the focus of Split Decisions-is that Halley seeks a specific substantive, rather than a
methodological, hiatus from feminism.
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theory is in any definitional or substantively finite sense. Rather, I argue
"queer," as in "queer legal theory"-similar to the "feminist" of "feminist legal
theory"-represents a methodological description. If, then, "feminist" and
"queer" represent methodological descriptions, specific projects may be
feminist and queer, feminist but not queer, or queer but not feminist, as existing
scholarship makes plain enough. However, I do not mean to suggest-as the
immediately prior categorization might-that feminism and queer theory are
distinct arenas of thought. To the contrary, I argue that Halley's unspecific
differentiation of feminist thought from queer thought problematically attempts
to disentangle what cannot, and perhaps ought not, be so smoothly
distinguished.
Part I of this essay summarizes Halley's arguments. I explore some of
Halley's valuable insights and register some important criticisms of her
arguments. Part II discusses feminist methodologies and argues the critique
Halley seeks is possible without taking a break from feminism. I illustrate this
point using Vicki Schultz's recent work on sexual harassment. Part III takes up
Halley's declaration that Duncan Kennedy's 1992 article "Sexual Abuse, Sexy
Dressing, and the Eroticization of Domination" 5 is "the only sophisticated legal
analysis of American sexual regulation that [she is] tempted to call queer."
6
More specifically, Part III considers two questions: What is queer legal theory?
And, is a queer domain necessarily split from feminism truly queer and truly
possible? By way of a conclusion, I argue that Halley should leave the take-a-
break-from-feminism rhetoric behind. It is distracting from, and unnecessary to,
the important points Halley makes, which I emphasize in Part I but do not
repeat in the Conclusion. Those are: (1) everything feminist and everything
spawned from something feminist should be subject to sustained critique; (2)
the power feminism engenders and wields must be checked; (3) the inevitable
"costs" that result from feminist projects must be taken into account even
though they may not outweigh the benefits; (4) a single theory of sexuality and
of power is unattainable and undesirable; and (5) there is value in theoretical,
and political, uncertainty, inconsistency, and incommensurability.
I. HALLEY'S ARGUMENTS
Split Decisions is concerned for the tough negotiations a person with Left
political commitments makes when the issues one cares about are inconsistent,
if not in direct tension. In a non-Halley example, consider access to abortion
services: someone who supports the right to choose to abort as well as first
amendment speech rights may find those interests irreconcilable when deciding
5. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, Sexual Abuse, Sexy Dressing, and the Eroticization of Domination, in
SEXY DRESSING ETC. 126 (1993).
6. HALLEY, supra note I, at 151.
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whether to permit aggressive protest of abortion providers. 7 It is in the
navigation of these complex negotiations-or "split decisions" as Halley calls
them 8 -that Halley urges us to learn to suspend-not to repudiate or quit-our
"feminist" commitments, if need be, in order to make room for others. 9 In
particular, Halley seeks to make politically and culturally viable interests
respecting sexuality that are, in Halley's view, diminished, devalued, or
otherwise hurt by certain feminist approaches to, and understandings of,
sexuality.
10
Thus, while Halley takes direct aim at "feminism," her general point is
broader in that she reminds us to be critical of all of our assumptions,
conceptions, and aspirations: 1
Perhaps [Halley's] ultimate point is that we can't make decisions about
what to do with legal power in its many forms responsibly without
taking into account as many interests, constituencies, and uncertainties
as we can acknowledge. To wield power responsibly, we need to fess
up to the fact that, in deciding to advocate, negotiate, legislate,
adjudicate, or administer one way or another, we spread both benefits
and harms across social and ideological life. 2
For example, if an employer accommodates a pregnant worker, it may shift
accommodation costs "possibly to places where they will hurt women; possibly
to places where they will hurt men, maybe only blacks will shoulder them, or
third-world workers; maybe they will go to places where no current
subordination theory can find them."'
' 3
7. Cf Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists,
290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (construing the Freedom of Access to Clinics Entrances Act
(FACE), 18 U.S.C. § 248, which creates a right of action against whoever by "threat of force . . .
intentionally . . . intimidates . . . any person because that person is or has been . . . providing
reproductive health services," so as to comport with the First Amendment).
8. See HALLEY, supra note 1, at 4 ("This book argues that, at least when it comes to sexuality, the
responsible way to engage in a politics that depends on theory and produces it... is to decide in the
splits between theories and between the interests they make visible, produce, and narrate.").
9. Halley repeats throughout the book that she is not looking to "kill [feminism], supersede it,
abandon it; immure, immolate, or bury it"; rather, she "merely [wants to] spend some time outside it
exploring theories of sexuality, inhabiting realities, and imagining political goals that do not fall within
its terms." Id. at 10.
10. See, e.g., id. at 65 ("1 have not found anyone determined to produce a theory or politics of
women's heterosexual desire for masculinity in men. It's just missing. Inside feminism I've found
affirmations of female femininity, female masculinity, and male femininity.., but not affirmations of
male masculinity. That, too, is just missing."); see also id. at 171 (noting with approval Duncan
Kennedy's recognition that some men eroticize women's subordination); Janet Halley, Sexuality
Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 182 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B.
Siegel eds., 2004) (arguing certain feminist "victories" in sexual harassment law translate to queer
"losses").
11. See, e.g., HALLEY, supra note 1, at 282 ("Would it possibly be a good idea for feminists, and
for people involved in related justice-seeking intellectuallactivist enterprises, to learn to suspend
feminism-indeed, to suspend antiracism, queer theory, trans theory, any theory-to interrupt it, to
sustain its displacement by inconsistent hypotheses of power, hierarchy, and progressive struggle? I
argue ... that it may well be.")
12. Id. at 9.
13. Id. at 287.
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Halley has three particular problems with feminism. First, feminism "is
persistently a subordination theory set by default to seek the social welfare of
women, femininity, and/or female or feminine gender by undoing some part or
all of their subordination to men, masculinity, and/or male or masculine
gender."' 4 Feminism, for Halley, thus involves, at a minimum, "a distinction
between something m and something f; a commitment to be a theory about, and
a practice about, the subordination of f to m; and a commitment to work against
that subordination on behalf of f.,,15 Second, Halley is troubled by feminism's
"deeply held but entirely dispensable view that [it] is an indispensable element,
if not the overarching structure, of any adequate theory of sexuality, gender,
m/f, and associated matters."' 6 Halley's third problem involves
a series of interconnected assumptions all feminists share with almost
all left-of-center theorists of sexuality in the tradition [she]
stud[ies] ... that one theory is better than many; that integrating
alternative theories together is the main goal of our work; that reality
must come fully into line with, be engulfed by, theory; that theory will
tell us all the crucial things we need to know about moral value and
emancipation. ' 7
Halley's conception of feminism is narrow.' 8 Efforts that do not fit her
formulation of feminism, by Halley's account (and in the service of her project)
part ways with feminism. Many of the projects Halley attempts to characterize
as diverging or fully breaking from feminism, however, are self-identified as
and arguably are feminist efforts. 19 True, feminism, for many, is a political
project concerned with power and, in particular, the operation and distribution
of power with respect to, but not exclusively, gender. And true, many
feminists accordingly examine the significance of gender by revealing and
criticizing the values, judgments, and assumptions around and through which
gender-based and gender-relevant inequalities are constructed, accomplished,
14. Id. at 4.
15. Id. at 4-5; see also id. at 16-22. In turn, Halley adapts the following shorthand for a "feminist"
project: "m/f, m>f, and carrying a brief for f." Id. at 5.
16. Id. at 5.
17. Id.
18. Somewhat strangely, even as Halley recognizes the diversity of feminist views, such as with
respect to sexuality, she insists on defining feminism solely in connection to only certain strands of
feminist thought.
19. For example, Halley describes JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE
SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (2d ed. 1999) as diverging from feminism on account of its critique of the
very idea of "woman." See HALLEY, supra note 1, at 137, 210. However, Butler's work is-to Butler
and others-feminist.
20. E.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, Feminist Legal Theory, 13 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L.
13, 13 (2005); id. at 19 ("How can the major feminist insight-that women live gendered lives, lives
shaped by experiences within a society whose institutions and ideologies are founded upon and
incorporate gendered assumptions-be reconciled with the equality paradigm as it is played out in law
as sameness or equality of treatment? By and large, there is no reconciliation.").
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and maintained.2' Nonetheless, there is little wholesale agreement about what
exactly constitutes feminism.22 On the other hand, and contrary to Halley's
21. For example, the concept of intersectionality is based on the observation that gender, race,
class, and other aspects of experience can interact to form hybrid forms of inequality and of identity. See
Kimberl& Crenshaw, Whose Story is it Anyway? Feminist and Antiracist Appropriations ofAnita Hill, in
RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 402 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992) (arguing sexism "intersects" with
racism such that the wrongs suffered by women of color are often different in content and form than
those that affect men of color and white women) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Whose Story is it Anyway?]; see
also Devon W. Carbado, Black Rights, Gay Rights, Civil Rights, in STRANGE BEDFELLOWS?: AN
UNCOMFORTABLE CONVERSATION IN FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY, supra note 2 (manuscript
at 391, 422, on file with author) (arguing civil rights proponents-specifically leading military-equality
activists in the LGBT community-must acknowledge and give content to the complexity of identity).
This recognition complicates and challenges dominant understandings of the operation of power and
inequality in society. Law and dominant politics often fail to appreciate the complexities of
discrimination. A Latina, for example, may not only face racism and sexism, but also racialized sexism
and gendered racism-her experience may be considerably different than those of Latinos, white
women, and even black women. Cf Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and
Sex: A Black Feminist Critique ofAntidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics,
1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 [hereinafter Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex];
Harris, supra note 26. Scholars concerned for intersectionality are also cautious with analogies-such as
homophobia is like racism as exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage is like laws against
miscegenation-because, despite being often powerful and effective, analogies tend to obscure the
experiences of people who face discrimination along multiple axes of power by emphasizing the parallel
rather than the intersectional aspects of identity, discrimination, and inequality. E.g., Kimberle
Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: lntersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of
Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins].
22. See generally FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY: ESSENTIAL READINGS IN THEORY,
REINTERPRETATION, AND APPLICATION (Nancy Tuana & Rosemarie Tong eds., 1995) (collecting a wide
range of feminist texts including "liberal feminist," "Marxist feminist," "radical feminist,"
"psychoanalytic feminist," "socialist feminist," "anarcha feminist and ecological feminist," and
"phenomenological feminist" perspectives as well as "perspectives on the intersections of race, class,
and gender").
Differences in conceptions of feminism can be subtle as well as striking. For example, compare the
following: NANCY LEVIT & ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK, FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: A PRIMER 1, 15-16
(2006) ("[F]eminism stands for the idea that women and men should have equal economic, political, and
social rights. Surely this is true, but there are many aspects to the story.... All feminist theories share
two things-the first an observation, the second an aspiration. First, feminists recognize that the world
has been shaped by men, particularly white men, who for this reason possess larger shares of power and
privilege. All feminist legal scholars emphasize the rather obvious (but unspoken) point that nearly all
public laws in the history of existing civilization were written by men.... Second, all feminists believe
that women and men should have political, social, and economic equality, they disagree about its
meaning and on how to achieve it."); Fineman, supra note 20, at 13 ("Feminism is not anchored by any
one discipline. It presents a theory of gender and challenges the assertions and assumptions of gender-
neutrality and objectivity in received disciplinary knowledge. As a group, feminists are concerned with
the implications of historic and contemporary exploitation of women within society, seeking the
empowerment of women and the transformation of institutions dominated by men."); Mary Joe Frug,
Rescuing Impossibility Doctrine: A Postmodern Feminist Analysis of Contract Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV.
1029, 1033 (1992) (defining feminist theory as "work that seeks to account for the condition of women
as well as to illustrate it or oppose it"); Linda Gordon, The Struggle for Reproductive Freedom: Three
Stages of Feminism, in CAPITALIST PATRIARCHY AND THE CASE FOR SOCIALIST FEMINISM 107 n.1
(Zillah R. Eisenstein ed., 1979) ("[Feminism is] an analysis of women's subordination for the purpose of
figuring out how to change it."); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 11 (1985) ("Feminism is the first theory, the first practice, the first
movement, to take seriously the situation of all women from the point of view of all women, both on our
situation and on social life as a whole. The discovery has therefore been made that the implicit social
content of humanism, as well as the standpoint from which legal method has been designed and injuries
have been defined, has not been women's standpoint. Defining feminism in a way that connects
epistemology with power as the politics of women's point of view, this discovery can be summed up by
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suggestion, there is quite broad agreement that sexual-subordination feminism
does not singularly constitute feminism. The point, as Martha Fineman
clarifies, is that "when we speak of feminism, it is necessary to clearly state that
there are many differences within feminism--difference in approach, emphasis,
and objectives-that make sweeping generalizations difficult."
23
Though Halley chides feminism for attempting to produce one all-
encompassing theory of sexuality, feminism does not actually purport to do
this. Rather, as the focus of Split Decisions makes clear, Halley's real problem
is with two strands of "sexual-subordination feminism, '24 not feminism in toto.
Specifically, Halley targets the structuralist accounts of sexuality that attend
both "power feminism" A la Catherine MacKinnon and "cultural feminism" A la
Robin West. Halley detests the anti-sex culture connected to the former and the
moralism that pervades the latter.25 Yet, that power feminism and cultural
feminism may each attempt a total theory of sexuality and that they can
compete to describe and explain the same set of circumstances, suggests a
disconnect, if not incompatibility, that further reflects my point that feminism
does not venture to present one theory of sexuality. Moreover, Halley's
criticism of MacKinnon and West reflects what other feminists have long
argued is wrong with those feminist endeavors: their questions beg their
answers, their theories are totalizing to a fault.26 Katherine Bartlett, for
saying that women live in another world: specifically, a world of not equality, a world of inequality.
Looking at the world from this point of view, a whole shadow world of previously invisible silent abuse
has been discerned."); and Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State. An
Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS 515, 531-33 (1982) ("Women and men are divided by gender, made into the
sexes as we know them, by the social requirements of heterosexuality, which institutionalizes male
sexual dominance and female sexual submission. If this is true, sexuality is the linchpin of gender
inequality.") [hereinafter MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State].
The difficulty, if not inability, of determining a substantive definition of feminism is further
highlighted by divergences in feminist views. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and
Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 304 (1995) (examining tensions and differences
in feminist thought about women's agency and women's oppression and victimization).
23. Fineman, supra note 20, at 13.
24. Halley refers to power feminism and cultural feminism as two important kinds of sexual-
subordination feminism. See HALLEY, supra note 1, at 41.
25. See id. But see Robin West, Desperately Seeking a Moralist, 29 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 1, 1-5
(2006) (responding to, and rejecting, Halley's claim that West offers a covert moral critique of women's
sadomasochistic desires).
26. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 873-74
(1990) (chiding MacKinnon and West, among others, for their totalizing views); Judith Butler, Against
Proper Objects, in FEMINISM MEETS QUEER THEORY 1, 9-10 (Elizabeth Weed & Naomi Schor eds.,
1997) ("Such a rigid determinism [as MacKinnon's] assimilates any account of sexuality to rigid
positions of domination and subordination and assimilates these positions to the social gender of man
and woman. But that deterministic account has come under continuous criticism from feminists not only
for an untenable account of female sexuality as coerced subordination, but for the totalizing view of
heterosexuality as well-one in which all the power relations are reduced to relations of domination-
and for the failure to distinguish the presence of coerced domination from pleasurable and wanted
dynamics of power."); Drucilla Comell, Sexual Difference, the Feminine, and Equivalency: A Critique
ofMacKinnon's Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, 100 YALE L.J. 2247, 2264 (1991) ("MacKinnon
fails to understand the critical lesson of deconstruction . . . that no reality can perfectly totalize itself
because reality, including the reality of male domination, is constituted in and through language in
which institutionalized meaning can never be fully protected from slippage and reinterpretation.");
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example, notes that "MacKinnon's theory is not something to be proved; rather,
it presupposes what it claims to prove, and is structured so that no set of facts,
logically, could ever disprove it."
27
Halley's narrow views of feminism to the side, for anyone interested in the
distribution and operation of power in society, Halley's point about scrutinizing
the power that feminism creates and wields is well-taken. With respect to law,
the impact of feminism over the past half-century has been relatively profound:
the effects of feminist insights and concerns are apparent in form, process, and
goals; evident in legal scholarship, 28 decisional law,29 legislation,30  and
administration. 31 Sexual harassment law, as discussed later in Part II.B, is a
prime example.
32
Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 585 (1990)
("The result of [MacKinnon's and West's] tendency toward gender essentialism.., is not only that
some voices are silenced in order to privilege others . . . but that the voices that are silenced turn out to
be the same voices silenced by the mainstream legal voice of 'We the People'-among them, the voices
of black women."). But see Catharine A. MacKinnon, Points Against Postmodernism, 75 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 687, 695 (2000) ("Feminism has ... never, to my knowledge, had what is called a 'monocausal'
narrative, at least I haven't.... It is also worth repeating that sexual politics, in feminism, is not an
overarching preexisting general theory that is appealed to in order to understand or explain, but a
constantly provisional analysis in the process of being made by the social realities that produce(d) it.").
27. Katherine T. Bartlett, Cracking Foundations as Feminist Method, 8 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC.
POL'Y & L. 31, 48 (2000); see also Jeanne L. Schroeder, Abduction From the Seraglio: Feminist
Methodologies and the Logic ofImagination, 70 TEX. L. REV. 109, 197 (1991).
28. Even scholars known for their non/un/anti-feminist positions, still pay heed to the influence of
feminist critique. E.g., Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 115 HARv. L. REV. 1314, 1317
(2000) ("Already there are signs that [interdisciplinary scholarship] is changing the internal perspective
of the academic legal profession by infiltrating doctrinal scholarship and changing the professoriat's
understanding of what constitutes good doctrinal scholarship and good teaching of core law courses:
scholarship and teaching that incorporates, to a degree anyway, and with considerable simplification, the
most influential of the interdisciplinary approaches, such as economic analysis of law and feminist
jurisprudence.").
29. E.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (holding not violative of the First
Amendment an application of Minnesota's antidiscrimination public accommodation law, which forbid
discrimination on the basis of sex, to compel the Jaycees to accept women as regular members because
"Minnesota's compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against its female citizens justifies the
impact that application of the statute to the Jaycees may have on the male members' associational
freedoms").
30. E.g., The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (The Violence Against
Women Act (VAWA)), Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title IV, §§ 40001-40703, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994),
invalidated in part by United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18, 627 (2000) (striking down civil
remedy as beyond Congress's power under the Commerce Clause as well as the enforcement clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment).
31. For example, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the Agency for Toxic
Substances and Disease Registry established in 1994 the Office of Women's Health "to promote and
improve the health, safety, and quality of life for women." Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
CDC/ATSDR Office of Women's Health, About Us, http://www.cdc.gov/women/about.htm (last visited
Mar. 5, 2007). Though it is not readily apparent what the precise impetus was for the creation of the
Office of Women's Health, it is, I think, safe to assume feminist influence given that feminists had long
pressed for attention to health concerns particular to women. It might also be noted that a comparable
"Office of Men's Health" does not exist, though the CDC does devote webspace to men's health
concerns. Compare id. with Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Men's Health,
http://www.cdc.gov/men (last visited Mar. 5, 2007).
32. See infra Part 11.B (discussing Vicki Schultz's work on sex harassment law).
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Halley's argument goes further than merely checking the "formal"
influence feminism engenders and exerts. Feminist theory, for many of us,
fundamentally affects how we understand life, society, intimacy, and ourselves.
Feminist ideas not only describe and critique, they also shape reality,
perspectives on history, and aspirations for the future. That is, subject
formation-who we are and what we know 3 3 -is influenced by feminism.
Halley therefore makes an interesting point about trying to see what is there
when feminism is not.34 Though I am skeptical about how to implement
Halley's point as a practical matter,35 it might still be worth considering what,
if anything, is missed in our feminist commitments and commitment to
feminism. 36 What, if anything, are we blinded, desensitized, or made unmindful
by and to? Indeed, "presupposing that [feminist] theory fully describes the
world-refusing to Take a Break to see whether something else might be going
on as well or instead--commits feminism to being unable to see around comers
of its own construction." 37 Though Halley may overstate the situation, it is a
useful reminder, particularly as feminist ideas and concerns become, over time,
further institutionalized, assimilated, entrenched, and co-opted. For there may
be cause for great concern when mainstream and conservative hands redirect
feminist ideas away from their original objectives, dilute those ideas to
effective irrelevance, or deploy them against their authors. And certainly we
must be attentive to abuses of power committed by feminists or in the name of
feminism.
Halley's arguments against the normative demand to harmonize and
reconcile theories of sexuality and of power are also noteworthy. I support
Halley's effort to
[s]ustain[] competing theories for describing the same social
arrangements [in order to] expand our sense of the stakes at stake when
we make our choices about what to see as a social good and a social
33. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 27 (1977)
("[T]here is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any
knowledge that does not pre-suppose and constitute at the same time power relations"); MICHEL
FOUCAULT, Truth and Power, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS
1972-1977, at 109 (Colin Gordon ed., 1980).
34. Halley seeks both to suspend as well as to critique feminism. There is an important difference,
however, between those efforts: feminism's suspension suggests an absence of feminism, while
critiquing feminism requires feminism to remain very much present. See supra note 4.
35. While certainly we can do things to try to get outside of feminism-such as engage with non-
feminist texts and ask non-feminists to examine our work-my skepticism goes to implementing
Halley's suggestion that we totally turn off feminist influence in our understandings of the workings of
the world. See JUDITH BUTLER, THE PSYCHIC LIFE OF POWER: THEORIES IN SUBJECTION (1997)
(considering ways in which psychic life is a product and producer of the social distribution and
operation of power).
36. See, e.g., Brenda Cossman, Sex, Gender, and Feminism After, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 617,
618 (2003) ("Janet's methodology is a productive one. It has allowed her to produce counter narratives
of the operation of power on the terrain of sexuality, narratives that were obscured from within
feminism's male/female binary.").
37. HALLEY, supra note 1, at 321.
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bad, how to understand their distribution, what to think of as
normatively bad, and what to aspire to.
38
Halley continues:
I hope to elicit your desire to think that no one theory, no one political
engagement, is nearly as valuable as the invitation to critique that is
issued by the simultaneous incommensurate presence of many theories
(past, present, and still to be made). We decide immense questions of
social distribution and social welfare-substantive, strategic, and
tactical-when we commit to one of these theories over another. I am
promoting a left-of-center political consciousness that makes such
commitment perpetually contingent on redecision at the level of
theory. I am urging us to indulge-precisely because we love justice
but don't know what it is-in the hedonics of critique.
39
Because we never know what exactly the future holds and because we are
perpetually on truths' tail, it would prove impossible to devise a complete or
perfect theory of sexuality or of power. We can, I suspect, always think up
situations and circumstances that in one way or another challenge, disjoint,
undermine, reverse, or operate without reference to any purportedly perfect
theory. Moreover, to compose a complete or perfect theory is objectionable if
we are interested to discover and achieve greater practices of freedom and
democracy in addition to incidences of well-being and self-determination.40
Sexual desire, for example, is simply too variable and too unpredictable.4 1
Manifold perspectives and competing, and complementary, ideas-all always
provisional and subject to disproof-yield knowledge, innovation, and
criticism.
Though Halley is certainly on to something, her insights, as the next Part
explains, echo what many feminists have long maintained with respect to
methodology.
II. FEMINIST METHODS
In this Part, I explain why, and then how, Halley's critique is possible
without taking a break from feminism. First, I discuss feminist methodology to
show that Halley's arguments reflect, and do not contradict, the methods many
38. Id. at 8.
39. Id. at 9.
40. Cf SMITH, supra note 3, at 182 ("We can only begin to imagine subjects who have yet to be
invented, let alone their rights and responsibilities in communities that will only faintly resemble our
own.... We have no reason to assume that we are peculiarly endowed with an ability to make all
contemporary and future antagonisms transparent.").
41. See, e.g., Allegra Long, Soap and Water, in THE BEST AMERICAN EROTICA 1997, at 227, 229
(Susie Bright ed., 1997) ("You'd think that, at least, would be a turnoff, but nothing is predictable about
sexual arousal.").
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feminists engage. Second, I review Vicki Schultz's scholarship on workplace
sex harassment to illustrate the broader point.
A. Feminist Methodology, or, Is Halley Saying Anything New?
For Halley, reality, not theory, drives the train because theory sometimes-
quite possibly always-fails to adequately, let alone perfectly, describe,
explore, and explain what is really going on: "My desire," Halley tells us, "is a
posture, an attitude, a practice, of being in the problem, not being in the
theory., 42 Thus, while theory is "the effort to form hypotheses about what is
happening in the world and about the various social goods and bads that are
being distributed among people, 4 3 the task of theorists is not to understand
reality in a way that comports with our theories, rather it is to theorize in
relation to our changing realities.
Though this point is a welcome reminder, it is just that. Feminists have
long pressed and practiced methodologically that which Halley hopes to elicit.
Notwithstanding some feminist projects, 44 many feminists acknowledge and
embrace the idea that no one theory could ever provide the exact, the perfect,
explanation; these feminists eschew totalizing "grand theory" and instead opt
for "middle-range theory" grounded in everyday experience.4 5 Thus feminist
methodology tends to involve making theory more concrete, by, for example,
emphasizing lived experience, context, situation, and specifics, not
abstractions. 46 Angela Harris, for example, notes that feminist methodology, in
which ideas are tentative, relational, and unstable, helps to avoid dangerousS• 47
essentialisms. Feminist methods tend to complicate rather than to simplify or
to generalize. Feminist methods are typically critical, at times purely
descriptive, but almost always insistent upon constant curiosity, if not
downright suspicion, even of those things understood to be feminist. Indeed, as
previously noted, many of the political and theoretical divergences considered
in Split Decisions are identifiably and arguably feminist, or at least the product
42. HALLEY, supra note 1, at 7.
43. Id. at 6-7.
44. E.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989); see
Bartlett, supra note 27, at 46-53 (arguing MacKinnon's method and substantive theory merge); Butler,
supra note 26, at 9-10 (criticizing MacKinnon's totalizing claims); Cornell, supra note 26, at 2264
(same); Harris, supra note 26, at 585 (same). But see MacKinnon, supra note 26, at 695-97 (responding
partially to these claims).
45. SHANE PHELAN, GETTING SPECIFIC: POSTMODERN LESBIAN POLITICS, at xvi (1994); Martha
Albertson Fineman, Introduction to AT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW: FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY, at
xi, xi-xii (Martha Albertson Fineman & Nancy Sweet Thomadsen eds., 1991); cf ROBERT K. MERTON,
SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 68 (1967) (describing middle-range theory).
46. E.g., PHELAN, supra note 45 (examining the notion of specificity and arguing its importance to
lesbian identity politics); see Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REv. 617, 637-
38(1990).
47. See Harris, supra note 26, at 586.
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of feminist methods grilling feminist theories.4 8 Some feminists' critical stances
are achieved by taking the point of view of women--"asking the woman
question"49-in order to challenge male-dominated processes and institutions.50
Feminist methods can accordingly involve bringing women's experiences to
the foreground. 51 The employment of such methods recognizes the validity and
importance of women's experiences and grounds feminist theory and
research.52 Yet, other feminists take aim at the very idea that gender ought to be
a salient concept for social organization and goods distribution, 53 questioning,
for example, the reification of gender that can occur through a monolithic focus
on the subject of "woman. 5 4
As Martha Fineman notes in At the Boundaries of Law-the very first
volume of feminist legal theory-feminist theory is evolutionary in nature:
"Feminist methodology at its best represents a contribution to a series of
ongoing debates and discussions which take as a given that 'truth' changes over
time as circumstances change and that gains and losses, along with wisdom
recorded, are not immutable but part of an evolving story." 55 In this regard, as
Katherine Bartlett argues, feminist method is feminist theory.
56
[T]o be engaged, with others, in a critical, transformative process of
seeking further partial knowledges from one's admittedly limited
habitat [is a central goal of feminism]. This goal is the grounding of
feminism, a grounding that combines the search for further
48. See, e.g., supra note 19 and accompanying text.
49. Bartlett, supra note 26, at 837 ("[A]sking the woman question means examining how the law
fails to take into account the experiences and values that seem more typical of women than of men, for
whatever reason, or how existing legal standards and concepts might disadvantage women.").
50. E.g., Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1988) (arguing that
modem legal theory is masculine and that the legal concept of "human being" contrasts with the
construct of "woman" in modem feminist theory).
51. E.g., Mari J. Matsuda, Liberal Jurisprudence and Abstracted Visions of Human Nature: A
Feminist Critique of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 16 N.M. L. REV. 613, 618 (1986) ("[W]ho makes
breakfast, who gets a paycheck, who gets whistled at in the street-all the experiences of daily life are a
part of the distribution of wealth and power in society.").
52. See Christine A. Littleton, Feminist Jurisprudence: The Difference Method Makes, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 751, 764 (1989) (reviewing CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DIscOtRSES
ON LIFE AND LAW (1987)) ("Feminist method starts with the very radical act of taking women seriously,
believing that what we say about ourselves and our experience is important and valid, even when (or
perhaps especially when) it has little or no relationship to what has been or is being said about us.").
53. E.g., RIKi ANNE WILCHINS, READ MY Lips: SEXUAL SUBVERSION AND THE END OF GENDER
25, 87-88 (1997).
54. E.g., BUTLER, supra note 19.
55. Fineman, supra note 45, at xv; see also Bartlett, supra note 26, at 887-88; Fineman, supra note
20, at 23.
56. Bartlett, supra note 26, at 887. Bartlett argues for a method of "positionality" that recognizes
the contingency of "truth" but allows the feminist reformer to embrace a truth long enough to explore
experience and advance reform. See id. at 880-87. Bartlett's positionality sounds in what has been
described as "feminist standpoint epistemologies." See, e.g., Sandra Harding, Rethinking Standpoint
Epistemology: What is "Strong Objectivity?, " in FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGIES 49 (Linda Alcoff &
Elizabeth Potter eds., 1993) (discussing and defending feminist standpoint epistemologies).
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understandings and sustained criticism toward those understandings.
Feminist doing is, in this sense, feminist knowing. And vice versa.
57
Backing up a moment, it should be noted that "[f]eminist method signifies
the manner in which feminist scholars attempt to answer the epistemological
question 'how do we know what we know?' '58 There is not a set list of
"feminist methods," and what may not appear to be "method" often is; indeed,
feminist methodology can be found in narrative and storytelling,
59 art,60
music, 6 1 literature, 62 poetry,63 and psychological discourses, 64 for example.
Levit and Verchick identify "the fundamentals of feminist methods [to]
generally include (1) unmasking patriarchy, (2) contextual reasoning, and (3)
57. Katherine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDATIONS
550, 556 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993).
58. D. Kelly Weisberg, Introduction to FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDATIONS, supra note 57, at
529.
59. E.g., PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW
PROFESSOR (1991); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ROOSTER'S EGG: ON THE PERSISTENCE OF PREJUDICE
(1995); Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential
Method, 11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 7, 9 (1989). See generally Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of
Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971 (1991) (examining feminist narrative scholarship).
60. E.g., BARBARA KRUGER, THINKING OF YOU (1999) (collecting images of and essays about
Barbara Kruger's art); JANE LIND, JOYCE WIELAND: ARTIST ON FIRE (2001) (detailing the life and work
of Joyce Wieland); see, e.g., Peter Schjeldahl, Women's Work: Feminist Art at the Brooklyn Museum,
NEW YORKER, Apr. 9, 2007, at 73 (reviewing the "Global Feminisms" show inaugurating the Elizabeth
A. Sack Center for Feminist Art at the Brooklyn Museum).
61. E.g., CHRISTINA AGUILERA, Can't Hold Us Down, on STRIPPED (RCA Records 2002)
(criticizing double-standards on which outspoken women are portrayed badly); TRACY CHAPMAN,
Behind the Wall, on TRACY CHAPMAN (Elektra Records 1988) (describing domestic violence and the
lack of police response). Bjrk offers a more subtle feminism channeled through music and "[o]ne form
her feminism takes is simply ignoring conventional wisdom." Sasha Frere-Jones, Army of Two: New
Albums by Tori Amos and Bjirk, NEW YORKER, May 7, 2007, at 84, 84.
62. E.g., ISABEL ALLENDE, EVA LUNA (1988) (telling the adventurous story of Eva Luna, whose
mind is as strong as it is inventive); TONI MORRISON, SULA 52 (1973) ("Because each had discovered
years before that they were neither white nor male, and that all freedom and triumph was forbidden to
them, they had set about creating something else to be.").
63. E.g., SANDRA CISNEROS, Loose Woman, in LOOSE WOMAN: POEMS 112, 112 (1994) ("They say
I'm a beast. / And feast on it. When all along / I thought that's what a woman was. / They say I'm a
bitch. / Or witch. I've claimed / the same and never winced. / They say I'm a macha, hell on wheels, /
viva-la-vulva, fire and brimstone, / man-hating, devastating, / boogey-woman lesbian. / Not necessarily,
but I like the compliment."); JUNE JORDAN, A Short Note to My Very Critical and Well-Beloved Friends
and Comrades, in PASSION: NEW POEMS, 1977-1980, at 78 (1980) ("Then they said I was too confusing
altogether: / Make up your mind! They said. Are you militant / or sweet? Are you vegetarian or meat? /
Are you straight / or are you gay? / And I said, Hey! It's not about my mind."); NTOZAKE SHANGE, no
more love poems # 4, in FOR COLORED GIRLS WHO HAVE CONSIDERED SUICIDE/VHEN THE RAINBOW
IS ENUF 45 (1977) ("bein alive & bein a woman & bein colored is a metaphysical / dilemma / i havent
conquered yet / do you see the point / my spirit is too ancient to understand the separation of/ soul &
gender / my love is too delicate to have thrown / back on my face" (first, fourth, fifth, and seventh
forward-slashes denote line breaks; second, third, and sixth in original)); see also AUDRE LORDE, Poetry
Is Not a Luxury, in SISTER OUTSIDER 36, 37 ("For women, then, poetry is not a luxury. It is a vital
necessity of our existence. It forms the quality of the light within which we predicate our hopes and
dreams toward survival and change, first made into language, then into idea, then into more tangible
action.").
64. E.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT (1982) (arguing women tend to possess different values and ways of interacting with
others on account of varied psychological development and experience).
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consciousness-raising."65 Though Levit and Verchick may be descriptively
accurate, we ought to hesitate on "unmasking patriarchy," 66 for it would seem
to presuppose the subordination of women to men, or females to males, as
Halley contends is definitional to feminism. Thus, without denying that many
feminist projects are expressly concerned with patriarchal and, more generally,
gendered inequalities and subordination, we might recast "unmasking
patriarchy" as "asking the gender question."67 Cast as a question, the method is
released from any substantive and prescriptive commitments attendant to a
characterization in terms of patriarchy. For example, "asking the gender
question" does not entail the outcome-oriented positions of "ending women's
subordination" or "increasing women's power" that would tend to attend
"unmasking patriarchy" as method. If, however, invoking gender necessarily
requires acknowledging that the very concept of gender is predicated on
gendered inequality, "asking the gender question" may too operate
substantively. 68 Yet, I do not understand gender in such a manner. Gender is
not the property of any one theory, let alone subordination theory specifically.
69
That is, the concept of gender is not properly studied through any one
framework or discipline or with any particular vision in mind. So conceived,
"asking the gender question" does not necessarily presuppose any substantive
agenda. Indeed, "asking the gender question" could end up advocating that
women give up power to men in some realms, such as caretaking. It should also
be noted that "asking the gender question," unlike "asking the woman
question, 70 does not reify the totalizing category of "woman"-dutifully
scrutinized by critical race, trans, postmodern, and poststructuralist theorists,
among others.
With respect to feminist legal theory, many feminists understand law as a
manifestation and a process of power in society: law has developed over time
65. LEVIT & VERCHICK, supra note 22, at 45 (citing Bartlett, supra note 26, at 836-37).
66. 1 hesitate as well at offering even a tentative list of methods because doing so may serve to
corral and contain. See Gary Lawson, Feminist Legal Theories, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 325, 325
(1995) (discussing the dangers of defining certain ideas or sets of ideas as "feminist legal theory").
67. This is certainly not to say that unmasking patriarchy is not something feminists do. Nor am I
suggesting that "asking the gender question" is the most appropriate or best method to always engage.
See, e.g., Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: The Gender Paradox and the Limitations of
Discrimination Analysis in Restructuring the Workplace, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 79, 112 (1989)
(arguing that adopting gender as the category of analysis in specific instances may obscure women's
position).
68. See Bartlett, supra note 27, at 39-40 ("Feminist method looks for gender bias, based on the
hypothesis that gender bias exists.")
69. Moreover, as Butler states:
Where and when a feminist analysis accepts th[e] cultural presumption [that sexuality is a
function of relations between women and men], feminism actively recapitulates heterosexist
hegemony .... But when and where feminism refuses to derive gender from sex or from
sexuality, feminism appears to be part of the very critical practice that contests the
heterosexual matrix, pursuing the specific social organization of each of these relations as
well as their capacity for social transformation.
Butler, supra note 26, at 12 (emphasis omitted).
70. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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to reflect dominant ideologies and historical arrangements, 71 but also is an
important source of power and site of democratic contestation. From this
perspective, "the task of feminists concerned with the law and legal institutions
must be to create and explicate feminist methods and theories that explicitly
challenge and compete with the existing totalizing nature of grand legal
theory., 72 Thus the term "feminist," when used to modify "legal scholarship,"
emerges as a methodological description. 73 Indeed, "[r]ather than develop any
substantive theory of sex inequality or how to remedy it, feminist legal
methodology focuses on the tools of how to practice feminist legal thinking and
the ways of documenting the experiences of gender."
74
Feminist legal work tends not only to thoroughly evaluate outcomes but
also to reveal and to scrutinize preceding and underlying processes, standards,
rules, values, and ideas.75 Feminist legal theory often challenges assumptions
and ideologies that drive and justify biased values, standards, norms, structures,
and aspirations amid which we live and against which results are measured and
appraised. 76 In this regard, many feminist legal theorists-often critical of, if
not expressly oppositional to, the status qUo 77 -offer and advocate alternatives
to existing orders.78  At their cores, many feminists are radically
nonassimilationist on the understanding that mere inclusion into or
accommodation by dominant culture typically present measly challenges to
entrenched-widely and wildly pervasive-ideologies that stimulate and
71. See Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered
Nature of Legal Reasoning, in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDATIONS, supra note 57, at 571, 571-73.
72. Fineman, supra note 45, at xiii.
73. Bartlett, supra note 27, at 34.
74. LEVIT & VERCHICK, supra note 22, at 45.
75. See, e.g., MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State, supra note 22, at 539-40.
76. E.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY I -
54 (2004) (challenging dominant conceptions of autonomy, independence, and self-sufficiency); Martha
Albertson Fineman, Dependencies, in WOMEN AND WELFARE: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE UNITED
STATES AND EUROPE 23 (Nancy Hirschmann & Ulrike Liebert eds., 2001) (same); Martha Albertson
Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence, Autonomy, and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 13, 17-23 (2000) (same).
77. E.g., Lani Guinier, Of Gentlemen and Role Models, in CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER
106 (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 2d ed. 2003) (discussing alienation and isolation begotten by
"gentlemen orthodoxies" in law school) [hereinafter CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM]; Kathleen Neal Cleaver,
Racism, Civil Rights, and Feminism, in CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM, supra, at 48 (challenging racism and
the lack of an adequate race critique among feminist activists); see Fineman, supra note 45, at xiii
("Feminist legal theory can demonstrate that what is is not neutral. What is is as 'biased' as that which
challenges it, and what is is certainly no more 'correct' than that which challenges it, and there can be no
refuge in the status quo.").
78. E.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995) (offering not only a searing critique of the current
concentration on the sexual connection between a husband and wife as the core organizing relationship
of family law, but also an alternative vision to aspire towards that elevates the caretaker-dependent
relationship to the center of society's concern for family); The Berkeley-Oakland Women's Union
Statement, in CAPITALIST PATRIARCHY AND THE CASE FOR SOCIALIST FEMINISM, supra note 22, at 355
(outlining a socialist feminist mobilization and vision); The Combahee River Collective, A Black
Feminist Statement, in CAPITALIST PATRIARCHY AND THE CASE FOR SOCIALIST FEMINISM, supra note
22, at 362 (outlining a black feminist mobilization and vision).
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sustain gendered inequalities, privileges, and disadvantages.79 These feminists
are also skeptical about the chances that legal reform will be at the forefront of
social change.
80
B. Halley's Project Is Possible Without Taking a Break from Feminism: An
Example
Vicki Schultz's recent work on employment discrimination in the form of
hostile environment sex harassment illustrates that Halley's critical stance, and
the critique of feminist projects she seeks, can be achieved without taking a
break from feminism. In two complementary articles, Schultz presents a
feminist critique of a feminist initiative-sexual harassment law-that, in her
view, has developed problematically such that it narrows antidiscrimination
efforts, buttresses employers' authority over employees and workplaces, and
contributes to an anti-sex, anti-intimacy culture.81 For Schultz, sex harassment
law, and sex discrimination law in general, need not generate these untoward
byproducts in order to deter discrimination, promote gender equality, and
improve possibilities for self-realization.
In "Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment," Schultz demonstrates that
judicial conceptions of sex harassment in the form of hostile work environment
were largely framed in sexual (as in sexuality) terms. 82 To be actionable under,
let alone violative of, Title VII, many judges all but required allegedly
harassing conduct to be of a sexual nature. 83 Furthermore, while judges tended
to presume sexual conduct was per se discriminatory because of sex, non-
sexual allegations, if they were even counted, were not granted the same
presumption. The focus on and privileging of sexual conduct, Schultz argues, is
unwarranted and unwise: unwarranted because Title VII's proscription of sex
79. See Fineman, supra note 45, at xi, xi-xii; Ellen Willis, Radical Feminism and Feminist
Radicalism, in No MORE NICE GIRLS: COUNTERCULTURAL ESSAYS 117, 117-19 (1992). However, some
feminists, including many in favor of strict formal sex equality, believe that integration is itself.a hugely
transformative project. See, e.g., Wendy W. Williams, Equalities Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal
Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325 (1985). The "equal
treatment" position has been widely criticized for doing little to eliminate actual inequality. See, e.g.,
Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REv. 797, 840 (1989) (arguing feminists should
aim not for gender-neutrality but to "deinstitutionalize the gendered structure of society").
80. See FINEMAN, supra note 78, at 14-24 (discussing the limits of law and legal reform).
81. See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1998)
[hereinafter Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment]; Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace,
112 YALE L.J. 2061 (2003) [hereinafter Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace I]; see also Vicki Schultz, The
Sanitized Workplace, in STRANGE BEDFELLOWS?: AN UNCOMFORTABLE CONVERSATION IN FEMINIST
AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY, supra note 2 (manuscript at 101, on file with author) [hereinafter Schultz,
The Sanitized Workplace II]; Vicki Schultz, Understanding Sexual Harassment Law in Action: What
Has Gone Wrong and What We Can Do About It, 29 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1 (2006) [hereinafter
Schultz, Understanding Sexual Harassment Law in Action).
82. See Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 81, at 1692-1738.
83. See id. at 1716-17.
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discrimination ("because of sex") says nothing about sexuality, 84 unwise
because it reflects a very cramped view of sex harassment. 85 For example, in
narrowly looking for sexual conduct, judges discredited or disregarded non-
sexual hostile work environment claims involving, say, putting rats in a
woman's locker, dangling her high above the floor in a stairwell, or a deliberate
campaign by men to sabotage the work product of the few women in their
department. 86 Though not obviously sexual in content or form, such harassing
conduct is nonetheless likely to occur "because of sex" and therefore, Schultz
argues, ought to be prohibited under Title VII to the same extent as expressly
sexual conduct. 87
In The Sanitized Workplace, Schultz demonstrates that, in addition to being
underinclusive, the sexual model of sex harassment is also overbroad because it
encourages companies to go overboard in regulating and disciplining sexual
expression that neither meets the legal definition of sex harassment nor
jeopardizes gender equality in the workplace. 88 In this regard, Schultz draws
our attention to the ways sexual harassment law, particularly as implemented
by management, aligns corporate power behind a historically punitive stance
toward sexuality, while at the same time averting legal, organizational, and
activist attention away from broader patterns of sex-segregation, in which,
significantly, harassment and discrimination both boom and are meted out.
89
Schultz's critique also emphasizes the ways in which the focus on sexuality can
be uniquely detrimental to sexual and racial minorities.90 For example:
84. Title VII provides that it is illegal for an employer to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's ... sex ... or ... to limit, segregate, or classify his employees
or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's.., sex ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l)-(2) (2000).
85. See Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 81, at 1738-55.
86. See id. at 1706-10 (detailing King v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wisconsin Sys., 898 F.2d
533 (7th Cir. 1990)); id. at 1717-20 (citing cases ruling against plaintiffs because their harassment
claims did not involve readily recognizable sexual advances or sexually motivated conduct); Schultz,
Understanding Sexual Harassment Law in Action, supra note 8 1, at 11-18.
87. See Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 81, at 1689. "When the
workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe
or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working
environment, Title VII is violated." Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc. 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (internal
citations, quotation marks, and punctuation omitted); see also Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,
66-67 (1968) (establishing that a violation of Title VII may be shown by proving discrimination based
on sex created by a hostile or abusive work environment).
88. See Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace 1, supra note 81, at 2087-136; see also Schultz,
Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 81, at 1789-96.
89. See Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace I, supra note 81, at 2136-58; see also Schultz,
Understanding Sexual Harassment Law in Action, supra note 81, at 18-42.
90. See Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace I, supra note 81, at 2158-63; see also Halley, supra note
10 (arguing the current sexual-harassment regime facilitates "sexuality harassment" in which sexual
minorities are accused of sexual harassment by homophobes). For example, whereas a straight man
might not care much if his avowedly straight co-worker slaps his butt, he might care a lot, and view it as
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[T]he fixation on sexual advances has led to a two-tiered system of
justice in which people perceived to be homosexuals are frequently
penalized as sexual harassers, but rarely, if ever, protected as
harassees. Within organizations, the drive to suppress sexuality has
also created disproportionate problems for homosexuals and other
sexual minorities, whose sexual expression-and even mere
presence-may be perceived as offensive or threatening in a world
governed by the ethic of asexuality.
91
Schultz also worries that the campaign to exterminate sexuality in the
workplace-enhanced and legitimated by sexual harassment law-undermines
other human interests:
In the name of productivity and order, [the logic of sanitization] grants
employers the power to control not only sexuality, but all the other
emotional drives and dramas of human life: reproduction and care,
birth and death, accident and aging, disease and disability, friendship
and solidarity, and even love and romantic partnership.
92
In place of the sexual model, Schultz articulates a vision93 of sex
harassment law that equalizes the risk of legal liability for sexual and non-
sexual harassment and focuses on whether the alleged harassment undermined
a plaintiffs competence. 94 Schultz also advocates tying the risk of legal
liability to the level of segregation and inequality in the relevant job setting,
such that employers with highly sex-segregated workplaces would face a
greater risk of liability than employers that achieve full integration.95 By
harassing, if the spanker is gay-regardless of the intent of the spanker or the effect of the spank. Or,
studies show that some white women perceive sexual banter differently depending on the race of the
joker, with white men's being experienced as more acceptable and less harmful. See Schultz, The
Sanitized Workplace I, supra note 81, at 2159-63 (discussing Patti A. Giuffre & Christine L. Williams,
Boundarv Lines: Labeling Sexual Harassment in Restaurants, 8 GENDER & Soc'Y 378, 380-87 (1994)).
91. Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace 1, supra note 81, at 2171. Though the above quotation does
not expressly say so, Schultz is well aware that homosexuals and other sexual minorities may be
perceived as offensive or threatening not only because of an ethic of asexuality, but also, and perhaps
more so, because of an ethic of heteronormativity and compulsory heterosexuality. See id. at 2170-72.
92. Schultz, Understanding Sexual Harassment Law in Action, supra note 81, at 52.
93. Contrary to some readings of Schultz, e.g., Tucker Culbertson & Jack Jackson, Proper Objects,
Different Subjects and Juridical Horizons in Radical Legal Critique, in STRANGE BEDFELLOWS?: AN
UNCOMFORTABLE CONVERSATION IN FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY, supra note 2 (manuscript
at 325, 342-54, on file with author), Schultz's prescriptive vision is not limited to a juridical
intervention. Rather, Schultz's legal restructuring is situated within a broader, multi-dimensional
political movement aimed at dismantling the many facets of gendered discrimination and inequality. See
Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace I, supra note 81, at 2163-93.
94. See Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note 81, at 1755-96. For a critique of
Schultz's competence-focused scheme, see Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual
Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1169, 1215-17 (agreeing generally with Schultz's critique of the
sexual model of sex harassment but arguing that Schultz's focus on competence runs the risk of
"replacing one unitary theory of sexual harassment with another... [and] encouraging courts to turn
away from the regulation of sexualized harassment rather than pluralizing their analysis of the various
motives and modes of sexual harassment").
95. Specifically, under Schultz's scheme, if the job setting remains significantly sex-segregated or
otherwise unequal, the employer would face a more stringent set of rules that would make it easier than
it is now for plaintiffs to prove harassment occurred because of sex. But if an employer succeeds in
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apportioning risk of liability with respect to relevant job segregation, Schultz
aims to stimulate integration. This would benefit women far more than the
current scheme because sex discrimination generally, and harassment
particularly, flourish in highly segregated workplaces and tend to die out in
fully-integrated settings where women have the power in numbers to denounce
harassing conduct, destruct stereotypes, and help establish an agreeable local
workplace culture that may or may not involve a degree of sexual current.
96
Some critics have mistakenly lodged complaints about what they perceive
as anti-feminist arguments in Schultz's scholarship, particularly in light of
Schultz's indictment of the sexual model of harassment, which was invented by
some early feminist scholars and activists. 97 Robin West, for example, accuses
Schultz of disbelieving complainants and trivializing their complaints.
98
Though West misreads Schultz on this issue, 99 Schultz does-without a
doubt-sharply criticize the sexual model of sex harassment as well as its
intellectual foundation. Schultz disagrees with theorists, such as MacKinnon,
whose "reductionist view ... isolate[s] sexuality from other social relations and
treat[s] it as the primary mechanism of women's inequality"-the view from
which the sexual model was hatched and is justified. 00 Assumedly, Halley
approves of, if not applauds, this dimension of Schultz's critique. ' l Schultz,
like Halley, expressly criticizes totalizing feminist theories of sexuality, as well
as the view that sexuality alone generates gender inequality. Indeed, Schultz
proceeds on the assumption that non-sexual harms ought to be treated as
potentially injurious as sexual harms. In addition, Schultz, again like Halley,
insists upon an antiessentialist and contextual understanding of sexuality, 1 2 as
well as adopts a relatively sex-positive outlook. For example, Schultz's vision
of work and workplaces leaves room for the possibility of non-discriminatory
sexualized work environments and sexualized relations between co-workers.
Though there are numerous aspects of Schultz's scholarship that arguably make
it just the sort of thing Halley is looking for, I will mention one more. Perhaps
Schultz's most remarkable insight is the identification and criticism of a form
of sexuality regulation that heretofore has gone unnoticed. Schultz
proving that the relevant jobs (including all the supervisory positions above it) are fully sex-integrated,
the presumption that the conduct had occurred because of sex would be removed and thus a lower risk of
liability would apply. In such a case, an individual plaintiff could still prove that the conduct is
discriminatory, just as in any other disparate treatment case. For organizations in the middle, the current
liability rules would continue to apply. See Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace 1, supra note 81, at 2172-
84.
96. Id. at 2172-84.
97. E.g., Robin L. West, Law's Nobility, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 385 (2005) (critiquing Schultz
(and Halley) and defending, but modifying, MacKinnon).
98. See id. at 428.
99. See Schultz, Understanding Sexual Harassment Law in Action, supra note 81, at 41-42
(responding to West's claims).
100. Id. at9.
101. See Halley, supra note 10, at 198 (discussing Schultz's scholarship with approval).
102. See Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace 1, supra note 81, at 2136-39.
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demonstrates that workplace sexuality has become, in part because of sexual
harassment law, a site of serious forms of discipline and regulation, including
self-discipline and self-regulation, the observation of which, in the spirit of
Foucault,'0 3 tends to attract the intellectual attention of, and to alarm, theorists
such as Halley.'
0 4
Make no mistake: Schultz's work is feminist, substantively, prescriptively,
and methodologically. Schultz's criticism of the sexual model and its feminist
roots does not, and cannot, make Schultz un- or anti-feminist. To the contrary,
Schultz is particularly concerned for the rights and well-being of women and
sexual and racial minorities as well as about the operation of gender, sexuality,
class, and race. Furthermore, Schultz's work, like that which Halley hopes to
elicit, is driven by reams of empirical evidence and concrete examples; her
observations and theories are the result of meticulous and extensive reviews of
decisional law, workplace policies, sociological data, and other contextualized
evidence.
Ultimately, Schultz's feminist critique of a feminist initiative makes clear
that Halley's critical project is possible without taking a break from feminism.
Indeed, as this Part on the whole suggests, Halley effectively advocates
feminist methods, even as she ostensibly seeks their suspension. In other words,
while Halley advocates that we take a break from feminism, Halley means for
us to take a break from certain substantive feminist ideas and commitments, not
from feminist methods, which do not carry the substantive baggage Halley
proposes we both criticize and work beyond.
III. QUEER AND FEMINIST DIVISIONS AND DOMAINS
Split Decisions appears to argue for a queer domain that is both critical of
and beyond feminism.' 0 5 In the context of Split Decisions, then, inquiry into
what constitutes feminist thought begs the question: what is queer (legal)
theory? I argue, in Section A below, "queer," in "queer legal theory"-like
"feminist," in "feminist legal theory"-is best understood as a methodological
description; therefore, we cannot know what queer legal theory is in any
definite sense. Halley's work begs a further question: Is an unspecific queer
project that splits from feminism truly queer and truly possible? The answer,
103. See I MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION (Robert Hurley
trans., 1990) (1976) (tracing the relationship between sexuality and discursive practices, knowledge, and
power, arguing that sexuality is a historically-specific social construction, rather than a natural human
instinct).
104. Halley views herself as "a sex-positive postmodemist, only rarely and intermittently feminist,
a skeptic about identity politics, with a strong attraction to 'queer' revelations of the strangeness and
unknowability of social and sexual life, and a deep distrust of slave-moralistic pretensions to identity-
political 'powerlessness."' HALLEY, supra note 1, at 15.
105. To be beyond feminism is different than to be against feminism. In the former, feminism is
apparently absent, while in the latter feminism remains very much present. See supra note 4.
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presented in Section B, is no. Specific queer projects can break from feminism,
but a general or foundational differentiation between queer theory and
feminism is neither possible nor desirable.
A. What Is Queer Legal Theory?
The concept of "queer legal theory" is something of a paradox given the
tension between "queer" and "legal." "Queer," in its contemporary reclaimed
form,"° 6 tends to be associated with prideful opposition to, and transgression of,
dominant norms, especially those related to sexuality, gender, intimacy, and
kinship. 10 7 In support of these politics, much "queer theory" scrutinizes and
deconstructs dominant discourses (literary, scientific, political, etc.), subjecting
to withering critique the ideologies, ideas, and ideals that influence, enhance,
drive, and justify those discourses.l°8 A queer theoretical move might involve
highlighting, but also furthering, the incoherence of sexed and gendered
constructions, such as the "body" or the polarization and compartmentalization
of men from women, male from female, masculinity from femininity, or
heterosexual from homosexual. ° 9 Queer politics and queer theory are usually
106. See Francisco Vald~s, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of
"Sex, " "Gender, " and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 3,
346-50 (1995) (discussing the term "queer" in its historically oppressive, horrific, and shameful
rendering as well as in its contemporary reclaimed and hopeful form).
107. See DAVID M. HALPERIN, SAINT FOUCAULT: TOWARDS A GAY HAGIOGRAPHY 62 (1995) ("As
the very work implies, "queer" does not name some natural kind or refer to some determinate object; it
acquires its meaning from its oppositional relational to the norm. Queer is by definition whatever is at
odds with the normal, the legitimate, the dominant. There is nothing in particular to which it necessarily
refers. It is an identity without an essence. 'Queer,' then, demarcates not a positivity but a positionality
vis-h-vis the normative-a positionality that is not restricted to lesbians and gay men but is in fact
available to anyone who is or who feels marginalized .... ); PHELAN, supra note 45, at 151-54
(discussing queer politics); MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE
ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE 33-40 (1999) (discussing queer ethics and criticizing the sense that dignity and
sex are in tension); Michael Warner, Introduction to FEAR OF A QUEER PLANET: QUEER POLITICS AND
SOCIAL THEORY, at vii, xxv-xxviii (Michael Warner ed., 1993) (discussing queer politics) [hereinafter
FEAR OF A QUEER PLANET].
108. E.g., JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER: ON THE DISCURSIVE LIMITS OF SEX (1993)
(scrutinizing, among other texts, writings by Jacques Lacan, Willa Cather, and Nella Larsen, and Jennie
Livingston's film Paris is Burning to critically analyze the social construct and status of sex)
[hereinafter BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER]; JUDITH BUTLER, Quandaries of the Incest Taboo, in
UNDOING GENDER 152 (2004) (arguing for a rethinking of dominant psychoanalytic approaches to incest
and kinship); Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, How to Bring Your Kids Up Gay, in FEAR OF A QUEER PLANET,
supra note 107, at 69, 79 ("What the books I have been discussing, and the institutions to which they are
attached, demonstrate is that the wish for the dignified treatment of already gay people is necessarily
destined to turn into wither trivializing apologetics or, much worse, a silkily camouflaged complicity in
oppression-in the absence of a strong, explicit, erotically invested affirmation of some people's felt
desire or need that there be gay people in the immediate world.").
109. E.g., BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATrER, supra note 108, at 27, 30 (problematizing the concept
of "body"); WILCHINS, supra note 53, at 141-57 (same); see also Joan Nestle, Genders on My Mind,
Introduction to GENDERQUEER: VOICES FROM BEYOND THE SEXUAL BINARY 3, 9 (Joan Nestle et al.
eds., 2002) (noting writers such as Judith Halberstam and Jay Prosser, among others, are creating "new
gender histories: histories that will include the lives of men who spent many years living as lesbian
feminists; women who started their biological lives as men and now live as lesbians; histories that will
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suspicious of identity politics, 110 which tend to categorize and simplify human
organization and our engagements with power."' In this regard, queer politics
and queer theory often seek a volatility or precariousness of sorts. Certainly
other political movements and theoretical projects, including critical race and
feminist theory, have deployed similar strategies; yet queer theory provided,
and provides, a fresh articulation in a particular historical moment, coinciding
with and supporting the empowerment and safety of those who do not conform
to dominant-such as hetero-patriarchal---conceptions of natural or proper
sexual desire, gender performance, and anatomical form.
Meanwhile, law and the rule of law, especially as formal matters, articulate
dominant societal values, 113 even if sloppily and inconsistently. 114 Law tends to
approximate, implement, and reinforce dominant societal norms, rules,
ideologies, and aspirations. How "law," then, could ever be "queer" is
something of a mystery. Consider the queer "dilemma" over the
criminalization, decriminalization, and legalization of sodomy." 5 On the one
hand, we can expect queer concerns about the imposition of prudish
sensibilities, the disrespect-and potential punishment--of personal choices,
include the voices of people who live as both sexes when the medical world allows them; and histories
of mourning for the gendered selves not allowed to survive").
110. E.g., WILCHINS, supra note 53, at 79-88; Emi Koyama, Whose Feminism Is It Anyway?: The
Unspoken Racism of the Trans Inclusion Debate, in THE TRANSGENDER STUDIES READER 698 (Susan
Stryker & Stephen Whittle eds., 2006); Francisco Valdrs, Afterword-Beyond Sexual Orientation in
Queer Legal Theory: Majoritarianism, Multidimensionality and Responsibility in Social Justice
Scholarship, or Legal Scholars as Cultural Warriors, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 1409, 1443-48 (1998).
111. With respect to any poststructualism that may underpin queer suspicion of identity politics,
some caution is in order: "[The] very refusal to anchor experience in identifications ends up, ironically,
denying differences by either submerging them in an undifferentiated oppositional mass or by blocking
the development of individual and social differences through the disciplining compulsory imperative to
remain undifferentiated." Steven Siedman, Identity and Politics in a "Postmodern" Gay Culture: Some
Historical and Conceptual Notes, in FEAR OF A QUEER PLANET, supra note 107, at 105, 133.
112. E.g., WILCHINS, supra note 53, at 86; Paisley Currah, The Transgender Rights Imaginary, in
STRANGE BEDFELLOWS?: AN UNCOMFORTABLE CONVERSATION IN FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL
THEORY, supra note 2 (manuscript at 427, 446-47, on file with author) (arguing for "ensuring the many,
often conflicting, narratives of transgender identity that now appear in social and legal arenas continue
to circulate and even proliferate"); Stephen Whittle, Foreword to THE TRANSGENDER STUDIES READER,
supra note 110, at xi, xiv ("In trans theory there is an inherent recognition that the trans position is
problematic.").
113. See PAUL KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW 8 (1999) ("Law that appears to make no
contact with popular will, either past or present, is as problematic as law without reason. The ambition
of law's rule in a democratic polity is to reach a coincidence of will-popular consent-and reason.
Because this ambition is never fully or finally achieved, at every moment law stands in need of
reform."); see also id. at I (stating the rule of law is a culture that has "its founding myths, its necessary
beliefs, and its reason that are internal to its own norms").
114. See HALLEY, supra note 1, at 173-74 (noting that law is not a monolithic "consolidated entity
imposing its norms unilaterally on a social world made up simply of obedient and disobedient
subjects").
115. For an excellent critique of lurking conservative ideologies in queer approaches to intimacy,
see Martha T. McCluskey, How Queer Theory Makes Liberalism Sexy: Right-Wing Economic Politics
and the Queer Challenge to Feminism, in STRANGE BEDFELLOWS?: AN UNCOMFORTABLE
CONVERSATION N FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY, supra note 2 (manuscript at 182, on file with
author).
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and the lack of privacy that accompany illegal sodomy. Yet at the same time,
there is likely to be queer sensitivity to the fact that decriminalization and
legalization-and linked regulation-of sodomy may unleash thoroughly
undesirable consequences. A queer theorist may worry that decriminalizing
and, especially, legalizing sodomy could function to discipline sodomites and
others into existences significantly less free than those previously
experienced. 116 A queer theorist might be concerned, for instance, that along
with decriminalization, the sense of oneself as a sexual outlaw, as committing a
naughty endeavor, as involved in something wonderfully illicit or deliciously
scandalous, as transgressing purported community tenets-and the lush
imaginative life that feeds on such feelings and locations-would abate, if not
dissipate completely."17 For it may be sad indeed if in obtaining the right to
sodomy, that which was queer sunk into the banality of normalcy, even if over
the long term without immediate detection.
Of course, queer legal theory may not necessarily (though perhaps it could,
even if awkwardly) be interested in queering law. More than a decade ago,
Frank Vald6s called for the initiation of "Queer [sic] legal scholarship as a
theoretical and political enterprise devoted to the education and reformation of
legal discourse, culture, and doctrine regarding matters of (special) concern to
sexual minorities. ' 18 Vald6s continued: "Queer legal theory . . . is the name
employed ... to signify a self-conscious, self-defined, and self-sustaining body
of liberational legal scholarship that voices and pursues the interests of sexual
minorities as its particular contribution toward the end of sex/gender
subordination." 119 Vald6s later argued that "Queer cultural activism and
interdisciplinary theorizing . . . can provide the point of departure for
articulating and practicing Queer legal theory as a form of
multidimensionalized antisubordination praxis in sexual orientation sociolegal
contexts." 120 With regard to queer legal methods, Vald6s outlined eight non-
exhaustive methods for queer legal theorists to employ: 1) fighting
conflationary stereotypes; 2) bridging social science knowledge and legal
knowledge; 3) using narratives; 4) developing constructionalist sensibilities; 5)
conceptualizing "sexual orientation;" 6) defending desire as such; 7)
116. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM.
L. REV. 1399 (2004) (arguing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), which held consensual, adult,
private sodomy protected by the Constitution, relied on restricted notion of liberty and therefore may
function to domesticate gays and lesbians and ultimately limit their freedom).
117. Cf HALLEY, supra note 1, at 185 ("[P]rohibition [of sexual abuse] can deter, but it can also
become permission, and even intensify the value of rape to rapists.").
118. Vald6s, supra note 106, at 344; see also Francisco Vald6s, Queer Margins, Queer Ethics: A
Call to Account for Race and Ethnicity in the Law, Theory and Politics of "Sexual Orientation," 48
HAST1NGS L.J. 1293 (1997).
119. Vald6s, supra note 106, at 349.
120. Vald6s, supra note 110, at 1423.
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transcending "privacy;" and 8) promoting positionality, relationality, and
(inter)connectivity. 121
While Vald6s seems particularly concerned with a specific queer legal
project that takes up the interests of sexual minorities and the issue of sexual
orientation,' 22 I hesitate to define queer legal theory in such a manner. Queer,
as noted above, positions itself in opposition to, or at least at odds with, that
which is normal, dominant, or hegemonic, but there is nothing to which
"queer" necessarily refers.' 23 Accordingly, we cannot definitively know what
the project of queer legal theory is, even as the bulk of queer legal theories are
critical of the place and role of sexuality within law and legal institutions.
Queer theory, by design and intention, resists being pinned down and
delineated. The second you (think you) get your finger on it, a queer theoretical
move registers an exception or shifts away to posture contrary to what you
think you just identified. For example, it has been suggested to me that queer
theory, as a definitional and categorical matter, deals with sexuality and,
specifically, sexual desire. Yet while that may be an accurate accounting of
many queer theoretical texts, to define the entire queer project in such a manner
discounts and works to exclude consideration of, among other things,
asexuality. Indeed, many asexuals do not view the world, their relationships, or
themselves in, or even in relation to, sexual terms, let alone those of sexual
desire. If, then, an asexual is queer to a definition about sexuality and sexual
desire, that definition does not capture all that is queer and therefore fails.
Notwithstanding Vald6s's effort-a project I wholeheartedly support-the
term "queer" (as it is used in the general concept of "queer legal theory") is
best understood as a methodological description, rather than, as Vald6s seems
to suggest, in a more explicitly substantive and prescriptive sense. Borrowing
121. See Vald6s, supra note 106, at 364-72. "Fighting Conflationary Stereotypes" involves
eradicating "social and sexual gender stereotypes that facilitate the manufacture and use of socio-sexual
identity to devalue and subordinate sexual minorities and women." Id. at 365. "Bridging Social Science
Knowledge & Legal Knowledge" involves "import[ing] and employ[ing] the knowledge assembled by
the social sciences ... regarding sexual orientation and sexual minorities." Id. "Using Narratives" means
"air[ing] in legal venues the stories of sexual minority lives caught in the legal system for one reason or
another." Id. at 366. "Developing Constructionist Sensibilities" involves avoiding the dangers of
essentialism in order to recognize queer diversity even as queer commonalities are pursued. Id. at 366-
67. "Conceptualizing 'Sexual Orientation' involves "join[ing] in the unfinished task of conceptualizing
,sexual orientation' as a functional legal and social construct." Id. at 367. "Defending Desire As Such"
involves clarifying that "sexual and affectional intimacy, driven by erotic desires, is integral to
humanity" while recognizing that the concept of desire is problematic, particularly as legally significant
experience. Id. at 368. "Transcending 'Privacy' means "promoting the realization that sexuality is not
just about 'privacy' but about the ability to function in various social, economic, and political settings on
equal terms." Id. at 370. Finally, "Promoting Positionality, Relationality & (Inter)Connectivity" involves
building "social and legal empowerment and reconstruction out of intersectionality, multiplicity, and
coalition." Id. at 371.
122. But cf Valdas, supra note 118, at 1296-97 ("[lIt is urgent, and both substantively and
strategically imperative, for critical legal scholars who choose to write from a lesbian, gay, or bisexual
subject position to interrogate the racialized and ethnicized dynamics of sexual orientation identities and
issues as part of an evolving anti-subordination discourse.").
123. See HALPERIN, supra note 107, at 62.
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from David Halperin, queer method refers "not [to] a positivity but [to] a
positionality vis-A-vis the normative .... ,,124 Thus the method of queer legal
theory involves an oppositional or non-normative inquiry into law and legal
things. To the extent, then, some of the queer legal methods articulated by
Valdrs read or act as substance, I resist them too. While specific queer projects
certainly can and should do as Valdrs suggests, queer legal methods ought not
be defined in connection with substantive agendas and commitments. This is an
important point, for, as Judith Butler writes in different context:
It [is] necessary to affirm the contingency of the term ["queer"]: to let
it be vanquished by those who are excluded by the term but who
justifiably expect representation by it, to let it take on meanings that
cannot now be anticipated by a younger generation whose political
vocabulary may well carry a very different set of investments. ... That
it can become such a discursive site whose uses are not fully
constrained in advance ought to be safeguarded not only for the
purposes of continuing to democratize queer politics, but also to
125expose, affirm, and rework the specific historicity of the term.
Halley appears to agree with me about what makes legal scholarship
queer. 126 Halley identifies Duncan Kennedy's 1992 article "Sexual Abuse,
Sexy Dressing, and the Eroticization of Domination"
' 127 as "the only[128]
sophisticated legal analysis of American sexual regulation that [she is] tempted
to call queer." 129 And I do not think Halley wrote that lightly,' 30 nor should
she. 131 According to Halley, Kennedy's article is "distinctly queer in its
124. Id. (emphasis removed).
125. BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER, supra note 108, at 230; see also PHELAN, supra note 45, at
154 ("The hegemonic inscription of the queer as the sexual minority will then amount to an exclusionary
colonization of those who refuse their membership.")
126. It should be noted that Split Decisions does not include the definition of queer theory Halley
attempted to deduce as Ian Halley in "Queer Theory by Men." Compare Halley, Queer Theory by Men I,
supra note 2, at 50-53 (offering a definition of "queer theory"), with HALLEY, supra note I (offering no
such definition), and Halley, Queer Theory by Men Il, supra note 2 (same).
127. KENNEDY, supra note 5.
128. As discussed infra pp. 252-55, I do not agree with Halley that Kennedy's article is the only
sophisticated queer legal analysis of sexual regulation in the United States.
129. HALLEY, supra note 1, at 151.
130. In noting that Kennedy's article is the only sophisticated legal analysis of American sexual
regulation that she is tempted to call queer, Halley quipped a "sorry, folks!" which suggests she knew
the sentence would cause a stir. See id.
131. A February 12, 2007 search of the term "queer legal theory" in Westlaw's Journals and Law
Reviews database returned 125 results. Of these, cites for "queer legal theory" include JANET HALLEY,
DON'T: A READER'S GUIDE TO THE MILITARY'S ANTI-GAY POLICY (1999), CARL STYCHIN,
GOVERNING SEXUALITY: THE CHANGING POLITICS OF CITIZENSHIP AND LAW REFORM (2003), and
Vald~s, supra note 106. Works citing the previous texts as "queer legal theory" include Sarah Love,
Dodging the Traps of Cultural Authenticity: A Review of Richard Ford's Racial Culture: A Critique, 8
BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y 155, 175 n.157 (2006) (citing Halley's book as an example of queer
legal theory); David A.J. Richards, Carl F. Stychin, Governing Sexuality: The Changing Politics of
Citizenship and Law Reform, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 727, 730 (2004) (describing Stychin's book as a
"distinguished form of queer legal theory"); and Francisco Vald~s, Spain Gazing: Postcolonial
Aspirations, Neocolonial Systems and Postponed Reckonings-Queries From the Margins, 17 FLA. J.
INT'L L. 495, 497 n.6 (2005) (citing "[flor general readings on queer legal theory" Vald6s, supra note
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analysis of sexuality, power, and knowledge" because it considers sexual abuse
and sexual desire, not from the position of women (as some feminists do) but
from the perspective of a "'straight white male middle-class radical ... [who
does not] think of [himself] as a feminist.""' 32 It is these moves-to consider an
issue theretofore the domain of feminists from the perspective of a straight
white male middle-class radical who does not consider himself a feminist and
to "take into account the erotic interests of a person so situated"133-that makes
Kennedy's article queer for Halley.'
34
If I am correct that "queer," as applied to "legal theory," is best understood
as a methodological description, then queer legal theory and feminist legal
theory, in many instances, will very rightly collapse. To be sure, many stellar
pieces of feminist legal scholarship are also queer texts.' 35 Martha Fineman's
work on the primacy of the sexual connection to dominant and legal
conceptions of family is one noteworthy example. Fineman theorizes the
powerful concept of the "sexual family" in order to emphasize that, despite vast
transformations in family form and function over the past half-century, "our
societal and legal images and expectations of family are tenaciously organized
around a sexual affiliation between a man and woman."' 36 For Fineman, the
sexual family--despite aspirations of egalitarian gender roles-remains one of
society's most gendered institutions and is thus an engine for the realization
and perpetuation of patriarchy. 137 Though not emphasized by Fineman, her
110; Vald~s, supra note 106, at 344-77; and Vald~s, supra note 118). Carl Stychin, who is well-known
as a queer theorist, identifies as "queer legal theory" LESLIE J. MORAN, THE HOMOSEXUAL(ITY) OF LAW
(1996); Lisa J. Bower, Queer Problems/Straight Solutions: The Limits of a Politics of "Official
Recognition ", in PLAYING WITH FIRE: QUEER POLITICS, QUEER THEORIES 267 (Shane Phelan ed.,
1997); Paisley Currah, Politics, Practices, Publics: Identity and Queer Rights, in PLAYING WITH FIRE:
QUEER POLITICS, QUEER THEORIES, supra, at 231; Pierre de Vos, The Constitution Made Us Queer: The
sexual orientation clause in the South African Constitution and the emergence of gay and lesbian
identity, in LAW AND SEXUALITY: THE GLOBAL ARENA 194 (Carl Stychin & Didi Herman eds., 2001);
and Wayne Morgan, Queering International Human Rights Law, in LAW AND SEXUALITY: THE GLOBAL
ARENA, supra, at 208. See Carl F. Stychin, Couplings: Civil Partnership in the United Kingdom, 8 N.Y.
CITY L. REV. 543, 544 n.8 (2005).
132. HALLEY, supra note 1, at 171 (quoting KENNEDY, supra note 5, at 126, 129).
133. HALLEY, supra note 1, at 171.
134. See also id. (viewing Kennedy's article "as queer... because of its embrace of male
heterosexual erotic interests").
135. Anna Marie Smith's recent work on sexual regulation in welfare policy is an example of
excellent scholarship that is feminist and queer. See ANNA MARIE SMITH, WELFARE REFORM AND
SEXUAL REGULATION (forthcoming 2007) (arguing one of welfare reform's primary disciplinary and
regulatory targets is sexuality and, in particular, the sexuality of poor single mothers); Anna Marie
Smith, From Paternafare to Marriage Promotion: Sexual Regulation and Welfare Reform, in STRANGE
BEDFELLOWS?: AN UNCOMFORTABLE CONVERSATION IN FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY, supra
note 2 (examining sexual regulation dimensions of child support and marriage promotion policy)
(manuscript at 544, on file with author); Anna Marie Smith, The Sexual Regulation Dimension of
Contemporary Welfare Law: A Fifty State Overview, 8 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 121 (2002)
(demonstrating that welfare policy at the state level is a prominent site of sexual regulation).
136. FINEMAN, supra note 78, at 143.
137. The state, Fineman demonstrates, plays a leading role in fostering the sexual family's premier,
vital status. See id. at 145-49. The aim of family law, policy, and subsidy is assumed to be the
accommodation, protection, and privileging of this singular family form; the sexual family is considered
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scholarship shows the sexual family is also key to the operation and
continuation of heteronormativity and homophobia 38 as well as compulsory
monogamy. 39 In this regard, Fineman's work is both feminist and of concern
to sexual and gender minorities. Fineman's scholarship is also queer for several
different reasons, including that her critique presents a formidable challenge to
not only dominant conceptions of family, but also many feminist and gay and
lesbian projects that take for granted the primacy of the sexual connection,
140
even as they recommend it behave (e.g., egalitarian gender roles) and/or look
crucial to the formation and execution of social policy and society itself. See id. There are, for instance,
entire bodies of legal doctrines and rules that benefit traditional families, conferring special treatment on
them or protecting the interactions of their members. Civil marriage is a source of respect, legitimacy,
and subsidization on an array of levels. Federally, more than a thousand benefits are linked to marital
status. In 1997, the Government Accounting Office reported that federal law provided at least 1,049
benefits appurtenant to marriage. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT,
GAO/OGC-97-16, at 1-2 (1997), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/og97016.pdf. That
figure was increased to 1,138 in 2004. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT,
GAO-04-353R, at 1 (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04353r.pdf. Among those are
tax benefits, access to a spouse's healthcare benefits, automatic immigration status for a non-U.S. citizen
spouse, the right to take up to twelve weeks unpaid leave from work to care for an ill spouse or parent of
a spouse, as well as spousal access to Social Security, military, and veteran benefits. See id. At the state
level, the package of rights and benefits attached to marriage is similarly expansive, albeit state-specific,
affecting such things as tax benefits, inheritance preference at intestate, standing to sue for wrongful
death, exceptions from aiding-and-abetting liability, evidentiary privileges, transferability of real estate
and other valuable licenses, and the right to make decisions on a partner's behalf in medical
emergencies. See, e.g., Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 3-9, Conaway v. Deane & Polyack, No. 44 (Md.
Oct. 19, 2006) (noting plaintiffs, same-sex couples, and their children are denied hundreds of important
statutory, regulatory, common law, and other legal protections that are afforded to married couples and
their children under Maryland law) (citing EQUALITY MARYLAND, MARRIAGE INEQUALITY IN THE
STATE OF MARYLAND (2006), available at http://www.equalitymaryland.org/marriage/marriage
inequalityjin-maryland.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2007)), available at http://www.aclu.org/images/asset
-uploadfile156_27154.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2007).
The state is not, of course, the only institution and the law is not the only discipline that views
the sexual family as natural and ideal. FINEMAN, supra note 78, at 150-55. The large majority of
cultural, academic, medical, and media discourses position the sexual affiliation between a man and
woman as the natural, ideal familial nucleus, and a good number of these discourses draw on an even
more specific family image-that which is middle class, suburban, white, and married with children.
Even what appear to be satire or parody of the traditional family-television's incredibly dysfunctional
household A la Roseanne comes to mind-are typically premised on the traditional family as preface,
body, and conclusion.
138. For an examination of the role of the sexual family in heteronormative and homophobic
ideologies and cultural and legal biases, see Adam P. Romero, The Rule of Family, in STRANGE
BEDFELLOWS?: AN UNCOMFORTABLE CONVERSATION IN FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY, supra
note 2 (manuscript at 624, on file with author).
139. Fineman's work did to some degree focus on monogamy in that she critiqued the ways in
which dominant images of proper family behavior make men's presence definitional. See, e.g.,
FINEMAN, supra note 78, at 147-48 (arguing single mothers are viewed by the law and by society as
irregular and incomplete because "[they] represent the rejection of the primacy of the sexual connection
as the core organizing familial relationship"). For an examination of compulsory monogamy, see
Elizabeth F. Emens, Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous Existence, in STRANGE BEDFELLOWS?:
AN UNCOMFORTABLE CONVERSATION IN FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY, supra note 2
(manuscript at 493, on file with author).
140. For instance, the same-sex marriage movement offers, perhaps because of strategic necessity,
as its emblematic and only family that which has at its core a same-sex relationship.
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(e.g., same-sex couple) differently. 14 1 Fineman's ambition for family and
family law is also both feminist and queer. Fineman would cast aside the
current concentration on marriage and, more generally, the sexual connection
as the core familial relationship. Instead, Fineman would completely reorient
society's concern for the family so as to revolve around the caretaker-
dependent relationship, regardless of who is the caretaker and who is the
dependent. 142 Fineman's vision is queer in a particularly interesting way
because it does not involve, let alone require-as queer projects often do-an
affirmation of sexuality; indeed, Fineman urges an utter refiguring of our
understanding of intimacy-drained of sexuality and focused on care and
dependency.
That many texts are both feminist and queer does not mean that every
queer text must be feminist or that every feminist text must be queer. To the
contrary, a particular text can be all kinds of things. Indeed, as Halley argues,
Kennedy's article "Sexy Dressing" is an example of queer scholarship that is
not feminist. A second example of this type is Rick Rambuss's essay
"Indicatively Male," which deliberately imagines male-only spaces and
explains that gay men, in some instances, may have important interests not
valued or devalued in feminist literature. 143 With respect to feminist but not
queer scholarship, it might be argued that all feminist legal texts once were, in a
sense, queer-for example, if one believed all law was inherently male or
masculine. However, as noted above, feminist influence has, over the past half-
century, deeply impacted various legal fields, the fact of which negates the
notion that today feminist legal texts are always already queer. That is, feminist
texts may be queer, but they are not as such necessarily.
In sum, legal theory that is queer is legal scholarship that is oppositional or
at odds with that which is normal or dominant. The term "queer," then, refers to
relational scholarship that postures itself somehow against, or at variance with,
the normative. Though much queer legal scholarship concerns itself with sexual
and gendered minorities, the general term "queer," as I have suggested, is not
prefigured to refer to any issue or set of issues in particular. Furthermore, it is
141. E.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY
TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT (1996) (arguing extending marriage rights to same-sex couples will benefit
the institution of marriage, because gays and lesbians will create more equal relationships, as well as
benefit gays and lesbians, who will be encouraged to build enduring relationships); Carlos A. Ball, Not
Your Father's Autonomy: Lesbian and Gay Rights From a Feminist and Relational Perspective, in
STRANGE BEDFELLOWS?: AN UNCOMFORTABLE CONVERSATION IN FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL
THEORY, supra note 2 (manuscript at 451, on file with author) (arguing, on a feminist and relational
conception of autonomy, the state is obliged to recognize and support gay and lesbian relationships and
families).
142. See FINEMAN, supra note 78, at 226-36.
143. See Richard Rambuss, Indicatively Male: Stanley Kubrick's War Films and Male Military
Cultures, in STRANGE BEDFELLOWS?: AN UNCOMFORTABLE CONVERSATION IN FEMINIST AND QUEER
LEGAL THEORY, supra note 2 (manuscript at 292, 318, on file with author) ("As for feminism, it never
developed much of a lexicon (apart from terms of censure) for describing and analyzing what may be
perceived and experienced as 'indicatively male.'").
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important to recognize, that what may be queer in relation to certain things,
may not be queer in relation to others. That which is normative or dominant is
of course a matter of context and perspective. For example, while feminist
work on sexual abuse and desire may be queer in relation to what was once the
status quo, this work is the norm to which Kennedy's article is queer. The
slipperiness-as well as the positionality and relationality-of the idea of
"queer" thus emerges, and is affirmed.
B. Is a Queer Break from Feminism Possible?
Though Halley and I appear to be in agreement with respect to what the
"queer" in "queer legal theory" suggests-a methodological description-we
part ways as to whether a general-that is, unspecific-queer project is a
coherent alternative to feminism. While Halley seems to advocate a general or
foundational queer break from feminism, queer theory and feminism cannot,
and should not, generally or foundationally be disentangled.
144
Halley's call evokes concerns raised in Judith Butler's essay "Against
Proper Objects," which argues against a generalized disaggregation of
lesbian/gay/queer 145 work from feminism. 146 Specifically, Butler critiques the
claim that "[1]esbian/gay studies does for sex and sexuality approximately what
women's studies does for gender," 147 which in effect differentiates a discrete
lesbian/gay/queer project beyond the scope and authority of women's studies
and feminism. 148 Butler argues against the assignment of sex and sexuality to
the domain of lesbian/gay and queer studies, on the one hand, and the
assignment of gender to women's studies and feminism, on the other. 149 Not
only would such "proper objects" of study obfuscate the range of difference
and degree of complexity attendant to human organization, operations, and
engagements with power, 50 such consignments would function to dislocate
144. See Culbertson & Jackson, supra note 93 (manuscript at 327-33, on file with author). Though I
do not join Culbertson and Jackson's general read of Halley and Schultz-in fact I believe their
assessment of these scholars is partly mistaken-I am indebted to their essay for its explication of
similar arguments as those presented in this section.
145. Butler's essay slips at times between gay and lesbian studies and queer theory (perhaps as
result of the analogy-sex and sexuality is to gay and lesbian studies, as gender is to women's studies-
she critiques). Accordingly, I use those concepts somewhat interchangeably in this paragraph, though
they are not nearly ever so.
146. See Butler, supra note 26; see also Biddy Martin, Sexuality Without Genders and Other Queer
Utopias, 24 DIACRITICS 104 (1993).
147. Butler, supra note 26, at 4 (quoting Henry Abelove, Mich~le Aina Barale & David Halperin,
Introduction to THE LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES READER, at xv (Henry Abelove et al. eds., 1993)).
148. See Butler, supra note 26, at 4, 7.
149. See id. at 4-9.
150. See, e.g., David Valentine, "I Went to Bed With My Own Kind": The Erasure of Desire in the
Name of Identity, in THE TRANSGENDER STUDIES READER, supra note 110, at 407, 417 ("Looking at
what people say about what they desire, who they desire, and how they act upon those desires can
highlight for us the political nature of desire and the ways such yearnings are shaped by the identity
categories through which they are forced to speak if they wish to get a hearing. Such a focus can enable
2007]
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feminist theory from queer theory in an unproductive, if not counterproductive,
mannerl 5 1-unproductive, for example, because of course queers have a whole
lot to say about gender, as do feminists about sexuality; counterproductive, for
example, because disaffiliating queer theory from feminism might license and
reconstitute heteronormativity and heterosexism in feminism, on the one hand,
and, misogyny and sexism in queer theory, on the other.1 52 Rather, Butler
argues for antiessentialist, usually deconstructive, understandings of gender and
sexuality, 153 drawing particular attention to the erasure in the proposed
paradigm of other discourses on identity and power, such as those involving
class, race, and nation. 154 Butler's critique thus resonates with the insights of
critical race theorists, among others.
155
Again, it is not my argument that every queer text must be feminist or that
every feminist text must be queer. Rather, while specific queer projects can
break from feminism-conduct themselves outside of feminism, for example-
Halley seems to be mobilizing an unspecific, general, and foundational queer
domain that functions both beyond and against feminism. As a methodology,
then, Halley's call to take a break from feminism is problematic like the claim
criticized by Butler. It risks reproducing the troubling assignment of "proper"
objects of study (gender here, sexuality there); obscures significant currents of
feminist and queer thought; and falsely assumes possible an identifiable yet
general distinction between feminist theory and queer theory. Moreover,
Halley's formulation-in committing the projects to distinct spheres-is
fiercely undercut by the slipperiness of the concept of queer. Queer-as a
general, unspecific, and definitional matter-is too slick, too itinerant, too
relational to simply take a break from feminism. (And feminist thought is too
unstable, too contextual, and too evolutionary to be simply taken a break from.)
For example, it might be said that certain feminist conceptions of sexuality are
queer vis-A-vis those forms and flavors of sexuality that Halley hopes to
us to look more closely at the seemingly neutral categories of 'gender' and 'sexuality,' and complicate
the relationship between them. And, most usefully, it requires us to not simply assume that desire is self
evidently explained by the categories 'gender' and 'sexuality' in using them to talk about the complexity
of erotic lives.").
151. Butler, supra note 26, at 4-9.
152. Id. at 23. For example, Butler notes that
[ilf sexuality is conceived as liberated from gender, then the sexuality that is "liberated" from
feminism will be one which suspends the reference to masculine and feminine, reinforcing
the refusal to mark that difference, which is the conventional way in which the masculine has
achieved the status of the "sex" which is one. Such a "liberation" dovetails with mainstream
conservatism and with male dominance in its many and various forms ....
Id.
153. See id.
154. Id. at 24.
155. E.g., Evelyn Hammonds, Black (W)holes and the Geometry of Black Female Sexuality, in
FEMINISM MEETS QUEER THEORY, supra note 26, at 136; Carbado, supra note 21; Crenshaw,
Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex, supra note 21; Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins,
supra note 21; Crenshaw, Whose Story is it Anyway?, supra note 21; Harris, supra note 26; Valdrs,
supra note 110; Valdrs, supra note 106; Valdrs, supra note 118.
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resuscitate, advance, imagine, and experience. In other words, if Halley's queer
domain is conceived, for the sake of argument, to be a BDSM156 den, it is the
MacKinnonites, not necessarily the Bersani's,'57 who are queer in relation to
the BDSM erotics achieved, enjoyed, and, most significantly, dominant in that
environment. Yet, to be sure, BDSM erotics are queer with respect to notions of
sane sexuality that prevail, at least rhetorically, in mainstream channels.
The complexity and contingency of societal and personal operation and
organization as well as the distribution and use of power in its many forms
suggests that rather than articulating a queer domain that is necessarily beyond
or against feminism, we ought to generate always sensitive, contextualized, and
incomplete accounts of difference, of gender, of sexuality, of power. Because I
see this vision as Halley's actually desire, I urge her to abandon the unspecific
call to take a break from feminism.
CONCLUSION
That Janet Halley's recent scholarship, 158 culminating in Split Decisions,
has rubbed quite a few people the wrong way, is largely the result of Halley's
unabashedly blunt call to take a break from feminism. 59 This frankness, though
effectively provocative, is distracting from-and unnecessary to-the
important arguments I believe Halley to actually be making about power,
politics, theory, sexuality, and gender. 16 What is more, Halley's apparent queer
break from feminism suffers from several fatal flaws. First, the definition of
feminism that Halley offers is incredibly narrow: all feminism is collapsed into
dominance feminism and cultural feminism, and then Catherine MacKinnon is
allowed to dictate the former and Robin West the latter. Second, because the
methodologies long engaged by many feminists do not necessarily entail the
substantive commitments of which Halley is critical, the critique Halley seeks
156. "BDSM" includes bondage and discipline, sadism and masochism, and domination and
submission. See generally SADOMASOCHISM: POWERFUL PLEASURES (Peggy J. Kleinplatz & Charles
Moser eds., 2006).
157. For Halley, Leo Bersani's essay "Is the Rectum a Grave?" is canonical queer theory. See
HALLEY, supra note 1, at 150, 151-67 (discussing Leo Bersani, Is the Rectum a Grace?, in AIDS:
CULTURAL ANALYSIS, CULTURAL ACTIVISM 197 (Douglas Crimp ed., 1988)).
158. E.g., Halley, Queer Theory by Men I, supra note 2; Halley, supra note 10.
159. For example, at a recent Feminism and Legal Theory Project workshop on relations and
tensions among feminist and queer legal theories, several presenters and audience members railed
repeatedly against Halley's suggestion about taking a break from feminism. See DVD: An
Uncomfortable Conversation: Feminist and Queer Legal Theory-Convergences and Departures
(Feminism and Legal Theory Project 2005) (on file with the Emory University School of Law Library).
160. Specifically, Halley's important insights include: (1) everything "feminist" and everything
spawned from something "feminist" should be subject to sustained critique; (2) the power feminism
engenders and wields must be checked; (3) the inevitable "costs" that result from feminist projects must
be taken into account even though they may not outweigh the benefits; (4) a single theory of sexuality is
unattainable and undesirable; and (5) there is value in theoretical, and political, uncertainty,
inconsistency, and incommensurability. See supra Part I and Introduction.
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is possible without taking a break from feminism. Indeed, feminist methods
invite and instantiate the rigor and critique Halley advocates. Third, the idea of
a general queer domain, beyond but also critical of feminism, 161 not only fails
to account for a great deal of feminist and queer thought, it also incorrectly
assumes there is a fixed, stable body of thought called feminism from which to
take a break. In reality, feminism is too unsettled for the possibility of its
general suspension to be realizable. And because the concept of queer is
relational, a premeditated queer domain that is always already outside of or
opposed to that which is feminist is problematic as a general, foundational, or
unspecific matter. However, as I have stressed, specific texts can and do
countenance a variety of characteristics, such as being feminist and queer, and
queer yet not feminist. In making these points, I argued that the terms
"feminist" and "queer," when used to modify "legal scholarship" and "legal
theory," represent methodological descriptions that do not carry substantive
commitments. Some feminist methods include "asking the gender question,"
consciousness-raising, and contextualized reasoning. Queer methodology
reflects a contrary positionality vis-A-vis the normative or dominant. If
"feminist" and "queer" are best understood as descriptions of method, then we
cannot know definitively what feminist legal theory and queer legal theory, as
such, substantively are or do.
While writing this essay, I have struggled over whether the focus on
method is, in a sense, politically disempowering or strategically misplaced. Is
it, for instance, dilutive of feminist and queer political mobilizations to suggest
that we cannot conclusively define and delineate feminism or queer theory?
Even if it is to particular political and theoretical interests, the focus on method
serves an important safeguarding and democratizing role. Leaving discussion
and debate over feminist and queer assumptions, conceptions, ambitions, and
aspirations perpetually unlocked and unfinished, the focus on method makes
for and produces a more dynamic, mobile, transformative, responsive,
informed, complex, and humble feminist and queer politics. In a wonderful,
and wonderfully honest, line of Split Decisions, Halley affirms that, with
respect to what she is trying to say and do, "it's impossible to get this right."
162
Indeed, all ideas, all ideals, this essay are necessarily imperfect. Life is too
multifaceted, too vibrant, too local for our means of communication-and
possibly even conceptualization-to ever perfectly capture what is really going
on and what really should be, perhaps especially on the frontier. There is, for
better or worse, always an exception.
161. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
162. HALLEY, supra note 1, at 15.
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Every woman writing in these years has had to swim in that feminist
wave. No matter what she thinks of it, even if she bravely swims
against it, she has been supported by it-the buoyancy, the noise, the
saltiness.1
INTRODUCTION
Adam Romero has made my task so much easier with his thoughtful
comments on Janet Halley's Split Decisions: How and Why to Take a Break
from Feminism. His review allows me to offer more of a reaction than a
review. When taken together, our pieces should encourage readers to engage
Split Decisions with equal parts affection and salt. For me, both ingredients are
necessary to recognize that Halley's observations-that life, law, theory, and
politics are complex, and that we should embrace the complexity, revel in it,
look forward to it, pursue it, and savor it-warrant affection because they arise
from an appreciation of the growth and progress that can (and often do) result
from working through complexities. Much like Adam's "what's new about
this?" my saltiness comes from having a "but we knew this already, right?"
reaction frequently during the course of reading Split Decisions.
My reaction begins with a brief description of the project Halley envisions
for her intervention. I then assess the two aspects of Halley's genealogy of
feminism, feminist theory, and feminist legal theory that elicited the most
visceral reaction for me: her taking a break tests, and the gaps in her assessment
of how her intervention differs from feminism's approach to complexities. In
Part II, I address what is for me the primary source of frustration with Halley's
effort-the failure to acknowledge the body of resistance projects into which
Split Decisions fits. Whether or not she agrees with the prior interventions,
Halley's project suffers from her lack of recognition that she is joining an
ongoing conversation. Finally, I encourage Halley to continue to offer her
important and novel contribution with vulnerability and bravery, especially
should she decide to expand her innovative critique of expressions of power
and powerlessness among mainstream and outsider feminists.
In Split Decisions, Halley sets forth the how and why of her proposed
intervention: taking a break from feminism. Although her fundamental critiques
are applicable and useful when considering nearly every other theoretical and
political social change movement, Halley takes on feminism exclusively and
challenges its impulse to smooth away, harmonize, reconcile, or subsume
conflicts (or splits) and mask (or deny) its unchecked power.
I have overwhelming affection for Halley's project, which is clearly born
of careful observation and thoughtfulness. There are times, however, when I am
1. GRACE PALEY, Two Ears, Three Lucks, in THE COLLECTED STORIES ix, xi (1994).
2. JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM (2006).
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underwhelmed by the why. For example, she does not fully explain why the
characteristics she challenges are particularly dangerous in the hands of
feminists. Finally, because of Halley's failure to consider preexisting
challenges or attempts to resist and reform feminism, I find the how deeply
flawed.
Now is the perfect time for a musical interlude:
Everybody sound the same, commercialize the game...
From "Beat Street" to commercials on Mickey D S3
This riff is taken from Hip Hop is Dead, the title song from the album
4dropped by Nas (a.k.a. Nasir Jones) last fall. In it, Nas critiques what he sees
as the ills plaguing the genre today.5 Not surprisingly, Nas is a hip hop artist
and the cut itself is hip hop. He uses hip hop to critique (perhaps even trash) hip
hop. Despite this provocation, hip hop lovers and haters alike rushed to buy this
cut. Even Nas's main rival, 50 Cent, has sought to cash in on the windfall by
using Hip Hop is Dead as an intro to his new album. Hip Hop is Dead was
wildly popular. It broke many records and simultaneously occupied top spots
on three different Billboard charts.
6
Yes, Hip Hop is Dead bangs and Nas rarely disappoints, but my sense is
that the title has played a significant role in boosting his sales and attention. I
attribute the high volume sales of this hip hop commentary on hip hop to the
fact that people wanted to know whether hip hop was, in fact, dead (despite
their recent purchase evidencing the contrary), or whether hip hop was just
dead for Nas because he was getting out of the game, A la Jay-Z. Regardless of
the precise reasons, Hip Hop Is Dead created buzz. What inquisitive minds
(mine included) found out was that Nas is not describing or calling for the end
of hip hop. He is offering a threat of sorts. A premonition, perhaps. To be sure,
he wants to make hip hop better and saw critique from the inside as a viable
way to urge producers and consumers to work to bring about that progress.
Halley, probably unknowingly, takes a page from Nas's playbook in Split
Decisions. She provides a provocative title that is irresistible to lovers and
haters of feminism alike. Like Nas, Halley created buzz around the opportunity
to find out what a leading scholar on feminism has to say about the past,
present, and future of feminism-even if she is suggesting that we need to take
a break from it. Unlike Nas, Halley even owns up to the irony (although near
the end of the book) and challenges of writing about taking a break from
3. NAS, HIP HOP IS DEAD (Def Jam Recordings 2006).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. The charts were the Billboard Hot 100, Top R&B/Hip Hop Songs, and Hot Rap Tracks. See
Billboard Artist Chart History, Nas, http://www.billboard.com (search "Music Search" by Artist for
"Nas"; click on "Nas"; then click "Artist Chart History") (last visited Apr. 12, 2007).
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feminism by writing about taking a break from feminism. 7 Halley also gives
readers much more than the title suggests in that her list of targets indicates that
we need a break not only from feminism but from feminist theory and feminist
legal theory as well.
Halley is smart, sassy, and self-confident. Her prose is stylish and at times
mirrors Nas's expertly executed syncopation-lulling listeners into head
nodding agreement (even if we don't agree). Halley deserves commendation
for her willingness and ability to be vulnerable, honest, and transparent. Such
openness and candor either goes unnoticed or is mocked. By bringing herself to
the text, she establishes herself as a much needed voice in legal scholarship.
And for the sake of solidarity, positive reinforcement, and goodwill, I will
follow her lead and disclose the following: I, a card-carrying, toaster-earning
lesbian, have also wished that I could click my heels and become a gay man.
Really. My wish is something about which my ex-"wife" and my current
"husband" have celebrated and commiserated.8 This disclosure serves another
purpose: It allows me to offer myself as living, though unremarkable, proof of
the complexities of sexuality and evidence of the ongoing contemplation of
how and whether feminism might assist us in navigating the wonderfully
complicated matters of sex and identity performance.
I. HALLEY'S INTERVENTION: ARGUMENT, THEORY, GENEALOGY, AND TESTS
A. Argument
Halley's argument is clear: Feminism is everywhere and it is powerful. She
believes that this powerful feminism does not realize (or denies) its power and,
as such, misses the ways in which feminist power hurts men, women, and the
left. Interestingly, Halley does not establish why feminism is any different from
other counter-majoritarian theoretical or political movements that also face the
complexities of law, life, and theory. By presenting the feminism problem in
isolation, Halley creates a blank slate for herself and her project. Certainly I can
appreciate the value in presenting a new problem and the solution all in one
project. The problem, however, is not new and presenting it as such
unnecessarily impedes the reader's ability to locate Halley's project and assess
the voracity of Halley's argument in relation to other projects with similar
aims.
In addition to Halley's narrow representation of the field of others who
share her identification of the problem and aspects of her argument, she does
not sufficiently establish that there is anyone who disagrees with her on the
7. HALLEY, supra note 2, at 310.




inability of any one theory to address complexities. In the ten pages and one
footnote devoted to her argument, Halley does not substantiate her claim by
identifying one theorist or group who fails to recognize and appreciate the
"splits." For example, when she mentions the "range of political and theoretical
incursions, all decidedly left of center and all simultaneously adding to and
competing with feminism, ' 9 she does not describe the incursions (on whom or
what), nor does she offer specifics as to how they have been competing with
feminism. Of course, there have been miserable failures in dealing with the
splits. There have also been successes. Halley either trusts her readers to trust
her or she has profoundly miscalculated the importance of solid examples of
the failures that center her argument and justify her intervention.
B. Theory
With such a provocative title and unambiguous argument, it is clear that
Halley intends to seize the mic and offer a theory on the state and fate of
feminism in support of her argument that we need to take a break from
feminism.' 0 According to Halley, when faced with issues related to sexual
politics, all current constructions of "left-of-center" U.S. feminism further a
male versus female anti-subordination project on behalf of women. There are
three essential components to her theory: the central subjects (men and
women), the central premise (men subordinate women) and the central
argument (the subordination of women by men should be eradicated). In other
words (or symbols), a feminism is not a feminism unless it includes "m/f, m>f
and carrying the brief for f.,,12 Halley contends that, in addition to being ill-
equipped to speak to the complexities of life and theory, this rigid formulation
always fails to deal with its own impulse to reinstate itself and therefore is
unable to check its own power.
Halley also charges that feminism lacks the ability to see the nuances that
might be present in any situation related to sexl (biological sex), gender
(everything else that distinguishes men from women), sex2 (the erotic), sexual
orientation (the subject of our erotic sex taken at any particular moment, to the
extent it can be ascertained), or sexuality ("some arrangement of most of
foregoing terms"). 13 Halley admits to engaging in "definitional violence" in
reducing these concepts to their bare essentials. 14 In a final note on the
9. HALLEY, supra note 2, at 11.
10. Id. at 20, 25-26.
11. She describes this in shorthand used throughout the book as "m/f, m>f and carrying the brief for
f." HALLEY, supra note 2, at 17-18.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 24.
14. Id. at 309.
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"taxonomic location" of her project, 15 Halley explicitly and joyfully informs us
that she plans to talk about sex. 16 I, for one, am glad.
C. Genealogy
Part II of Split Decisions constitutes Halley's genealogical laboratory. In it
she cuts, constructs, braids, and unbraids 17 her story of feminism. Halley not
only tells the theoretical story she knows, she tells the story in a way that best
facilitates her analysis and premise. This is not surprising. In fact this is what
lawyers are expected to do. We craft good stories in a way that favors a
particular client or case theory. I welcomed Halley's construction and
selections in mapping "the single protracted debate among feminist, gay-
positive, postmodernizing, and 'queer' theories of sexualities." 18 However,
Halley continues to underestimate the utility of placing her theory in the
context of a larger story of feminism fatigue. As I discuss in greater detail later,
she uses the Combahee River Collective's 1977 statement 19 as the sole example
of her convergence theory, while neglecting to point out that the Collective was
born out of splits that could not be smoothed over or reconciled with m/f, m>f,
and carrying the brief for f. This genealogical misstep is replayed throughout
Split Decisions. Halley does this to the detriment of her argument in that even if
she ultimately disagrees with their conclusions, she could have built from the
momentum of previous expressions of frustration with feminism in order to
help the reader more easily accept that which she recognizes will be difficult to
swallow.
D. Tests
In two rereadings of cases suffering from the impulses toward feminist
resolutions, Halley tests her theory of taking a break or even putting feminism
down in order to figure out alternative ways of dealing with the complexities of
sex, gender, and sexuality. First, she rereads Oncale v. Sundowner, a case
alleging same-sex sexual harassment. 20 In her rereading, Halley rightly shows
that sexual transactions can have many possible interpretations, and that
15. Id. at 22.
16. Id. at 22-23 ("This book-it's about sex.").
17. This is one of my favorite descriptions for deconstructive, post-structualist theoretical projects.
See Margaret Montoya, Mascaras, Trenzas, y Grenas: Unmasking the Self While Un/Braiding Latina
Stories and Legal Discourse, 17 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 185 (1994) (describing the "masks, braids and
uncombed messy hair" of learning to speak stories of marginalization and subordination and power
within traditional legal discourse).
18. HALLEY, supra note 2, at 38.
19. Id. at 82-91 (citing THE COMBAHEE RIVER COLLECTIVE, THE COMBAHEE RIVER COLLECTIVE
STATEMENT: BLACK FEMINIST ORGANIZING IN THE SEVENTIES AND EIGHTIES (1986)).
20. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
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feminism is but one. Further, Halley queries the reading of the facts of Oncale
by imagining the power of the bottom, i.e., the possibility that there may be
more sophisticated negotiations between the "victim" and the "perpetrators."
She challenges what she sees as feminism's myopia in dealing with sexual
conflicts even when there is no woman involved-the feminized actor is
always the victimized party in order to invoke feminism's protective shield.
Halley's critique here is solid and raises an important challenge to feminism's
power to define sexual transactions in a way that fits within a preset "script" of
human sexual behavior when harm is alleged.
On the other hand, Halley's "queering" of Twyman v. Twyman 2 1 does not
reflect a radical departure from feminism. In fact, Halley's rereading of
Twyman utilizes all forms of her feminist formula: m/f, m>f and carrying the
brief for f.22 First, by examining the sexual transactions and power negotiations
within the context of a divorce between a man and a woman, Halley joins the
legions of feminists who have addressed the distribution of power within the
institution of marriage. I wonder why she chose not to look to dissolution or
custody cases between f/f or n/in to highlight the limitations of feminism in
dealing with the complexities of sex and sexuality. There are several recent
custody cases where lesbian partners appealed to dominance and cultural
feminism to gain the upper hand. Their appeals to feminism essentially cancel
each other out and the courts are left to return to or reconstruct their traditional
notions of motherhood, nurturing, and the role of women in the family. In an
era where challenges to rn/f marriage abound, Halley's choice of Twyman
becomes an indirect endorsement of m/f as the appropriate traditional context
for examining the power dynamics of marriage. What is missing is Halley's
insight on the possibility of queering marriage to actually solidify and reify
itself as feminism has.
23
Halley misses another opportunity to actually challenge the feminist
formula by merely flipping the power dynamic in Twyman. Halley offers the
possibility that Mrs. Twyman exercised more power in negotiating the sexual
transactions that took place within the marriage, or f>m. Again, women's
power in marriage is a traditionally feminist proposition developed to challenge
the status quo ante, or what I call "prefeminism." As such, I found it difficult to
distinguish Halley's flip from the feminist impulse she denounces. I could
certainly imagine how self-congratulatory feminists would count Halley's
rereading of Mrs. Twyman in their win column. In order to more fully and
radically explore the possibilities that would flow from her theory, Halley
21. Id. at 284-85 (citing Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993)).
22. HALLEY, supra note 2, at 348-63.
23. "Queer... is an anti-identity identity .... Rather than sort out the real lesbians.., or the real
homosexuals from those that do not really qualify, queer is a status that is difficult to challenge." Laurie
Shrage, Passing Beyond the Other Race or Sex, in RAcE/SEX: THEIR SAMENESS, DIFFERENCE, AND
INTERPLAY 183, 185 (Naomi Zack ed., 1997).
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would have to truly take a break from feminism. For example, she could reread
Mrs. Twyman's actions as informal consent to a nonmonogamous arrangement
with her husband and his mistress where certain sexual, economic, and
emotional duties or acts were allocated to various partners. Mrs. Twyman
would have had her expectations disappointed when her husband sought to
reallocate duties (s/m sex) to her. This rereading could have distributed power
and agency to Mrs. Twyman without requiring Mr. Twyman's submission.
Finally, Halley's rereading of Twyman carries the brief for females in
much the same way feminism has. Although Halley's flip of power to Mrs.
Twyman may at first glance seem an empowering gesture, it can also be read as
another example of questioning the credibility of the women who make
allegations of sexual violence against men, especially their husbands. Halley's
empowerment of Mrs. Twyman depends on not accepting her testimony, which
risks reifying the status quo ante position of "she asked for it, she liked it, or it
was her duty." To her credit, Halley acknowledges the potential for such
misuses of her theory, but she does not address whether her theory can
overcome them. Halley does acknowledge that queer theory is not "the answer"
to the shortcomings of feminism, yet she does not discuss the impact of queer
theory's flaws or give illustrations of how queer theory would fail to yield a
different result from feminism-presently or eventually. Halley does not
subject her rereading to the same depth of critique as she does feminist theory,
nor does she employ a more challenging query of the role that the gender and
sexual expressions of the parties (including the possibility of queer motivations
for their sexual practices) plays within the institution of marriage or their
appeal to courts. Halley's queer rereading, without more, runs the risk of being
dismissed as merely critical feminist theory in rainbow flag drag.
II. "SPLIT AT THE ROOT?"
24
In much of Split Decisions Halley swims against what she sees as an
uncritical unyielding feminism on autopilot that increasingly fails to check its
exertions of power and claims to powerlessness. She seeks to flip the power
assumptions that drive the automated deployments of feminist power and
illustrate how feminism is ill-equipped to deal with the real life possibilities
that may and do exist beyond the feminist theoretical and political gaze. Yet,
there are moments in Split Decisions when, while appearing to head directly for
the murky choppy deep dangerous critical rip tide, Halley swims in tandem
24. This subtitle has special meaning to me and serves multiple functions. First, it is the title of an
article written by Margaret Baldwin. Margaret A. Baldwin, Split at the Root: Prostitution and Feminist
Discourses of Law Reform, 5 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 47 (1992) (addressing several of the questions
Halley represents as nonexistent). While in law school, Baldwin was a research assistant to Catharine




with the feminism she critiques. Moreover, Halley makes no ado, although
much is due, of the moments in Split Decisions when she is actually following
in their wake. I address a few of those moments here.
In Section A, I question whether Halley sufficiently makes the case for
taking a break based on her presentation of complexities, both real and illusory.
In Section B, I point out theoretical disconnects in Split Decisions' premise that
hinder the overall voracity of Halley's taking a break intervention. Finally, in
Section C, I address one of the most important factors informing my reaction to
Split Decisions: Halley's failure to align with those scholars who, for better or
worse, have long critiqued feminism and have sought with wildly varying
degrees of success to achieve results similar to those pursued by Halley in Split
Decisions. Since these aspects of Split Decisions represent moments when
Halley's analysis and execution of her theory actually split from her articulated
objective, I divide my discussion here into three subheadings: Conceptual
Splits, Theoretical Splits, and Methodological Splits.
A. Conceptual Splits
The central thrust of Halley's intervention is triggered by her observation
that feminism is unable to appropriately respond to the complexities of life,
law, theory, and sexuality. She correctly recognizes that the complexities of
each present opportunities to understand more and strategize more efficiently
and should, therefore, be embraced. Avoiding them, she continues, leads to
unchecked power and paralysis and a host of other ills that plague feminism,
feminist theory, and feminist legal theory. Halley warns that continued efforts
to smooth away the complexities ultimately harm the left's social justice
project.
1. Illusory Complexities
Despite their potential to bolster Halley's challenge that we demand more
from our movements and theories, Halley doesn't offer examples that would
facilitate our doing so. I suspect that one reason Halley may have decided not
to mention the hyper-complex issues that face all but the most rigid of feminists
(i.e., the rest of us) is that doing so would have impacted her convergence
critique dramatically. Specifically, dealing with such splits would have required
accepting the possibility that aspects of convergentists' claim may have some
utility. This acceptance and its implications for real splits is far too important to
be so broadly dismissed, as it is in Halley's analysis.
Halley's observations and warnings are hard to refute, but as Adam
Romero aptly points out in his review, she does not clearly establish that they
are needed by all feminists. As such, the feminist reader has little, if any,
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disinclination to the impulse to see herself as beyond the scope of Halley's
critique. It is all too easy to believe that one is not a member of Halley's
intended audience and thus exempt from the critique. For example, my reaction
was, "Who hasn't recognized the limitations of feminism, feminist theory, and
feminist legal theory?" This was more than rhetorical for me. I really wanted to
know who had failed to recognize these limitations according to Halley.
Halley's analysis would have been better served had she made it clear that she
was speaking directly to mainstream feminists who adhere exclusively to the
most vanilla articulation of feminism or had she dealt with the complexities that
face more radical feminists, outsider feminists, or those who identify as
members of the radical queer crit nation.
25
By allowing so many of her readers to legitimately disassociate themselves
from her critique, Halley also misses the opportunity to illustrate more
meaningful (read complex) examples of the disutility of feminism than
prostitution, pornography, and street harassment. Halley could have drawn
more of her comrades into her critique had she simultaneously and persuasively
addressed the limitations of feminist theory and queer theory in dealing with
the complex splits occurring within the feminist and LGBT communities.
Another fruitful site of complex splits is intraqueer relations, as evidenced
by the fact that in Washington, D.C., a popular trans prostitute coalition has no
alliances in the pro-sex feminist or mainstream LGBT communities.
26
Feminism's limitations play out prominently in the issues related to sexual
relations and transactions within the institutional context.
Other complexities that illustrate the limitation to feminism include
misogyny and homoeroticism in hip hop,27 men who sell sex to and for women
and women who sell sex to and for women, the titillating blogs on
fundamentalist Christian websites discussing matters ranging from vibrators
versus dildos with strap-ons to role playing,
29 voluntary intersexuality, 30
25. 1 use the term in its more general sense to refer to the collective of outcasts and sexual
minorities even among mainstream lesbians, gays, and transpeople. Similar to Frank Vald~s's use of
OUTCrit, my use of the term connotes a radical departure (if not rejection of the norm) while also giving
a shout out to ACT UP, the radical group whose members founded Queer Nation as a direct action
activist group in the early 1990s.
26. My colleague who works for a trans sex workers' advocacy project, Helping Individual
Prostitutes Survive (HIPS), had no connections with the Human Rights Campaign although her office
was less than a ten-minute walk from HRC's headquarters.
27. See, e.g., Eisa Davis, Sexism and the Art of Feminist Hip-Hop Maintenance, in To BE REAL:
TELLING THE TRUTH AND CHANGING THE FACE OF FEMINISM 127, 127-28, 131 (Rebecca Walker ed.,
1995) (relating her "split" when faced with the choice between buying "Doggystyle," with lyrics such as
"G's up hoes down," by Snoop Dog or "Black Reign," by Queen Latifah).
28. See generally TRICKS AND TREATS: SEX WORKERS WRITE ABOUT THEIR CLIENTS (Matt
Bernstein Sycamore ed., 2000).
29. JoAnn Wypijewski, The Way ofAll Flesh: On Christian Sex Sites, Anything Goes, So Long as
You Are Married, MOTHER JONES, July-Aug. 2006, at 22.
30. 1 used this term to mean intersexuals who decide not to choose between one sex or the other or
who choose to reverse surgical attempts to have their genitalia match their gender assignment at birth.
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sexuality expression in the context of involuntary institutionalization, 31 sexual
expression by and with minors,32 the "woman born woman" policy at the
Michigan Womyn's Music Festival,33 male and female circumcision,34 and the
concept of "down low," 35 including its racist, heteronormative, monogamy-
promoting, and homophobic underpinnings. 36 Finally, I have not found a
theory-feminist, queer, or otherwise-to help me wrap my head or heart
around barebacking as fetish.
37
2. Male-Affirming Feminists
Another conceptual problem with the basic premise of Split Decisions is
Halley's objection to the ways in which feminism fails to affirm or own up to
its relationship to maleness or masculinity. 38 While it is true that feminism's
relationship with men, maleness, and masculinity is fraught with complexities,
Halley's view that feminists' relationships with men occur simultaneously with
their closeted view that masculinity is the epicenter of power used in large part
to subordinate women is problematic. This objection becomes a theme that
animates her critique of governance and liberal feminism as well as laws,
theories, and politics that position women as perpetual victims and male
dominance and power as categorically injurious to women. Halley, however,
does not take on two important exceptions to her theory: the fact that white
feminists' equality theory is overtly male-affirming and that black feminism
has a political, theoretical, and historical connection to black maleness.
For years, feminists have struggled against the perception that they are
anti-male. Their struggle is most clearly seen in the extraordinary efforts many
feminists employ to rebut notions that the label is a synonym for lesbian. For
example, I have personally endured countless hours of tedious convergence
conversations justifying the presence of lesbians in the abortion rights
movement. The straight feminists in the room show no desire to risk the
privileges that flow from their intimacy with men. They fiercely protect it from
the threat of excommunication associated with lesbianism.
3 1. Brenda V. Smith, Watching You, Watching Me, 15 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 225 (2003).
32. JUDITH LEVINE, HARMFUL TO MINORS: THE PERILS OF PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM SEX
(2002).
33. "Woman born woman" refers to the "no trans" admissions policy at the festival.
34. See Hope Lewis, Between Irua and "Female Genital Mutilation ": Feminist Human Rights
Discourse and the Cultural Divide, 8 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. I (1995).
35. Despite the more appropriate term of closeted bisexual, black men who have sex and/or
relationships with men and women are referred to as "down low brothers." At least initially, they did not
use this term to refer to themselves. I am not sure why black men warrant their own term.
36. See Layli Phillips, Deconstructing "Down Low" Discourse: The Politics of Sexuality, Gender,
Race, AIDS, and Anxiety, J. AFR. AM. STUD., Fall 2005, at 3.
37. Barebacking is unprotected anal sex.
38. HALLEY, supra note 2, at 65.
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With equal fierceness, white feminists pursue equality with white men. In
fact, equality theory is a central organizing theme in liberal feminism. Equality-
based claims declare "I want equal access to educational and employment
opportunities. Laws and policies must impact and protect us equally. I want to
be equal!" Equal to whom? The answer reveals the inherent male centeredness
of feminism. Setting the male experience as the bench mark affirms masculinity
but Halley ignores this aspect of feminism, choosing rather to accuse feminists
of hiding their apparent love of their men, their sons, and their fathers. To
Halley, they do this because feminism, as presently constructed, cannot coexist
with men, which means it is time to take a break.
Halley's critique misses another important exception to her description of
feminisms' anti-male posture-black feminists' love for their men is an
important aspect of their feminism. Their work represents the strong trend in
the black community, almost exclusively, to focus on the plight of black males.
Far beyond affirming the masculinity of black males, black feminists have long
defended black maleness and incorporated it into their concept of the feminist
mission. 39 Further, black feminists have long employed more nuanced analyses
in their defense of black maleness than Halley's description of their approach to
splits acknowledges. For example, many black feminists diverged from
Halley's script when basketball superstar Kobe Bryant was accused of raping a
white woman in a hotel room, or during the murder trial of former football star
O.J. Simpson. In both instances, black feminists were able to take a break from
feminism in order to assess the implications of power, wealth, and masculinity
as well as gender, and resisted a prescriptive deployment of claims of racism
and sexism.
40
To be sure, it is not Halley's job to work through all possible corollaries
and parallels to her project. Nor must she engage all of the possible challenges
to how she has conceived of key elements of her project or the possible ways in
which her theory might result in changes antithetical to her leftist leanings.
However, Halley's decision to spend so little time "flipping" her own theory is
puzzling (or suspicious), especially given that the major thrusts of mainstream
feminist theory and black feminism present stark counters to fundamental
concepts in her analysis.
B. Structural Splits
Halley is right to locate Catharine MacKinnon's work at the genealogical
center of late twentieth century mainstream feminist legal theory. MacKinnon's
work, early and late, is the reference point that Halley uses to ground her
39. Consider the work of noted feminists Audre Lorde, Angela Y. Davis, and Pearle Cleage.
40. In her comments about the O.J. case, D.C. Delegate Eleanor Holmes Norton (a feminist)
discussed the spectacle as an assault on black male sexuality.
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critique of feminism, feminist theory, and feminist legal theory. It would not be
hyperbolic to suggest that without MacKinnon, we would not have much of
today's mainstream feminist legal theory. Nor would we have Split Decisions.
Halley's premise depends upon the power and influence of MacKinnon. What
at first glance appears to be Halley merely establishing MacKinnon at the
center of the feminist legal theoretical foundation is soon revealed to be
Halley's basis for identifying feminism as everywhere and feminism as ever
powerful.
Her formula for feminism could be expressed as: (1) MacKinnon is
feminism, (2) feminism is everywhere, and (3) feminism is solely a modality of
the left. For example, in her painstakingly detailed and exhaustive critique of
MacKinnon's oeuvre, Halley describes MacKinnon's brief in Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Services4 1 as advocating an "utterly remarkable"
formulation that endorses a "rigid, monolithic association of male bodies with
male gender and superordination, and of female bodies with female gender and
subordination. 4 2 She further attacks structuralism in her analysis of the binary
subordination model (m/f, m>f, carrying the brief for f) that permeates
feminism. While each proposition is intriguing and worthy of scholarly
attention, Halley proceeds as if these are foregone and uncontested conclusions.
By not acknowledging the myriad instances where U.S. feminism is fiercely
resisted (recall the Beijing Women's conference?), Halley's critique mirrors the
paranoid structuralism she sees in feminism.
I do not object to Halley's recognition that feminism is powerful and that it
has permeated many spaces previously closed to feminist influence. Halley is
also right to note that much of that power is unchecked and is exercised in
many ways without acknowledgment. Halley, however, makes feminism
appear much more powerful than I suspect it is. I am not convinced that
feminism is as omnipotent and omnipresent as Halley suggests. In her rereading
of Twyman, for example, Halley sees feminism as the culprit and engages in
little, if any, critique of the power of the institution of marriage, the parameters
of legal tribunals, or the power of the judges. Had Halley given us a sense of
how, if at all, Twyman would have played out prior to feminism's "take over,"
her critique would have been more persuasive. Halley's feminism is given far
too much responsibility for creating the Twyman experience, when it could just
as easily be understood as the result of an overly paternalistic court that was not
in the least influenced by feminism. The richer analytical alternative would
have been to help the reader assess the "pre-feminism" possible outcomes and
judge for themselves the utility of feminism versus taking a break.
41. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
42. Id. at 55 (citing Brief for National Organization on Male Victimization, Inc., et. al., as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (No. 96-
568), 1997 WL 471814.
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Implicit in Halley's analysis is the notion that all things woman equal
feminism and that all things queer equal the left, yet it does not accurately
reflect the current construction of feminism, queer sexuality/identity, or the left.
Consider Halley's point that feminist power is at work in the impact of NGOs
in Rwanda and Yugoslavia. 43 Halley offers as support for this contention a
quote indicating the importance of having women judges, lawyers,
investigators, and translators, especially those with expertise in gender crimes,
involved in the prosecution of the crimes.44 Halley's use of this quote shows
that she too is bound by a rigid construction of feminism that presumes women
who are experts in gender crimes are per se feminist. Would she make the same
assumption about men who become experts in gender crimes? Or a white
person who becomes an expert in racial issues? 45 Or straight men who become
experts in sexual orientation?
46
Halley continues her hyper-structural critique of structuralism (women =
feminism) when she equates the term "women of color" with "feminists of
color." For example, in describing a major split within feminism, Halley lists,
"women of color against white feminists.,,47
Finally, Halley appears to be carrying a brief for feminism in the same way
she says that feminism carries a brief for women. This very subtle shift appears
in Halley's discussion of one of the benefits of taking a break: a realistic view
of the power of feminism.48 She sees the failure to fully appreciate the power of
feminism as bad faith and thinks that suspending this bad faith, i.e., taking a
break, might enable feminism to "participate in a much more expansive
political engagement. 4 9
So, this is Halley's Nas moment. She actually wants feminism to succeed.
While Halley discloses that she changed her mind several times during the
course of writing Split Decisions, this particular flip (making feminism better)
is too important not to be addressed directly.
If hip hop should die, we die together
Bodies in the morgue, [we] lie together .... 50
Another manifestation of Halley's structuralist alter ego is her desire to
further the goals of the left. 51 First, Halley seems to accept without proof that
43. HALLEY, supra note 2, at 57.
44. Id. at 365 n.3.
45. See, e.g., IAN HANEY L6PEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996).
46. See, e.g., Devon Carbado, Men, Feminism and Male Heterosexual Privilege, in CRITICAL RACE
THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE 525 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 2000); see also BLACK MEN
ON RACE, GENDER AND SEXUALITY: A CRITICAL READER (Devon W. Carbado ed., 1999).
47. HALLEY, supra note 2, at 188.
48. Id. at 344.
49. Id.
50. NAS, supra note 3.
[Vol. 19:259
Splitting the Difference
the left exists today in a meaningful way and she leaves unexamined the
implications the power of the left have on feminism. If she assumes that her
attack on feminism is an attack on the left, she is reifying her structuralism ties
by seeing the two as bound. Even if Halley assumes that her critique of
feminism is a critique of the left, she would also need to acknowledge the
reality that at times feminism and the left have mutually exclusive goals. Either
way, would Halley be willing to consider taking a break from the left? I doubt
it. It does not occur to her that her problems with feminism might be the
byproducts of problems of the left. Without acknowledgment or analysis,
Halley seems to have an impulse towards the left similar to the impulse she
finds so distasteful in feminism, even though the left's power, structure,
rigidity, and denial of the blood on its hands is legendary.
Halley's premise is that by improving sexuality theories and politics, we
get closer to achieving leftist objectives. This position seems to suggest that
sexuality incursions, queer interventions, and taking a break are connected to
leftist politics. Not only does right-wing poster man Paul Wolfowitz's
description of his current girlfriend as his "domestic partner" (a term created by
sexual minorities) challenge Halley's presumption that matters related to sexual
others necessarily further objectives of the left, but far more ordinary
complexities also preclude Halley from sustaining queer sex as sole province of
the left. One has only to look to pro-choice right-wing conservatives like Rudy
Guiliani, feminist anti-choice conservatives, Log Cabin Republicans, and right-
wing, fundamentalist religious conservatives and their wives who engage in
online discussions of their sex play with butt plugs and dildos.
52
Halley leaves the readers (regardless of their political affiliation) to their
own devices when considering the utility of taking a break. This cannot be
avoided. When she fails to critique the left or even acknowledge counterleftist
complexities within feminist/queer identities/performances, it seems as though
they do not matter. It also shows that, rather than acknowledge, address, or risk
the sex splits within her own political orientation (or the political splits within
her sexual orientation), Halley abandons her own advice and seems to embrace
rigid formulations, construction, and claims to power.
C. Methodological Splits
While there are exhilarating aspects of Halley's project, she often fails to
acknowledge the kinship between her critique of feminism and the scores of
similarly postured critics who have resisted feminism and its power for
decades. When these resistance theorists appear in Halley's analyses, they are
51. HALLEY, supra note 2, at 3; see, e.g., Eli Zaretsky, Psychoanalysis, Marxism and Post-
Structuralism, in SOCIAL THEORY AND POLITICS OF IDENTITY 206 (Craig Calhoun ed., 1994).
52. Wypijewski, supra note 29, at 22.
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described as hybrid, convergentist, or divergentist, or simply as feminism's
"others." Halley offers simplistic interpretations and relies on anecdotal
theoretical snap shots, without adjusting the speed or length of her stroke to
deal with the nuances and multiple possible interpretations of the snap shots.
There are moments when she works against her objective of establishing a
need for alternate theories and setting forth a novel theory on the limitations of
feminism, feminist theory, and feminist legal theory. Halley does not question
her reading of the intent of the convergentists nor other implications of their
"demands." Rather than establish the basis for her insight into convergentists'
intent or the contours and diversity of their demands she describes them as she
experiences them-a scary, demanding, monolithic blob causing "paralysis"
and "imposing tragic costs" with their "finely honed knives of self- and mutual
blame lying on the table. 53 Halley only for the briefest of moments
acknowledges that these prescriptive deployments also represent important
splits. She overlooks altogether that they are possibly (and often are) motivated
by a desire to take a break from feminism or, perhaps, create something new in
its place. She chooses rather to point out that convergence demands have been
elevated to the status of moralist mandates. Regrettably, she does not identify
who is responsible for this elevation-those outside or inside mainstream
feminism. The difference is substantial because the prescriptive deployments of
feminists outside mainstream feminism have enabled mainstream feminists'
uncritical use of split-motivated buzz words such as "of color," "margins," and
"intersectionality" as "get out of analysis free" cards. Surprisingly, Halley
reserves her disdain solely for the "race, class ... mantra" rather than applying
it to mainstream feminism's use of the mantra and buzz words to ostensibly
overcome many deadlocks and paralyses and, in turn, become more powerful to
its constituency.
Curiously, Halley makes no attempt to distinguish between her critique of
feminism and convergentists' propensity to accuse mainstream feminists of
"reiterating or even performing dominance." By not acknowledging (much less
incorporating) this important theoretical twist or its utility to convergentists and
their "targets," Halley misses an opportunity to offer the reader a new critical
dimension to the outsider critique of mainstream feminism while
simultaneously supporting her own premise.
Halley's decision not to acknowledge that her intervention exists within a
larger context of others who resist feminism is "highly puzzling if not
downright inexplicable." 54 Halley requires too much from her readers by
proceeding as if she has no knowledge of the preexisting projects addressing
53. HALLEY, supra note 2, at 192.
54. HALLEY, supra note 2, at 65 (discussing the "pervasive lack of interest in women's erotic




the limits and dangers of feminism and its unchecked power. Notwithstanding
the relative success of the projects, Halley's blind spots require her readers to
suspend their knowledge of the uncited works in order to stay focused on her
analysis. The strange thing is that despite the frustration created by being so
distracted by the ghosts in the margins, Halley's prose and ultimately the
concept behind this project is exhilarating and provocative, although I suspect
not in the ways Halley intended.
Halley's methodological misstep of not placing her intervention within the
context of a rich body of work resisting feminism that predates Split Decisions
has profound implications for the voracity of her intervention. Halley briefly
acknowledges that the limitations of feminism have been an important topic for
hybrid, divergent, and post-colonial feminist critical theorists. Indeed, their
critiques document feminism's limitations. She forces the reader to
continuously consider the reasons behind the omission. Rather than engaging in
syncopated head nodding (or shaking), the reader is asking, "Does she know
about X's work on this very point? She must. Then why doesn't she address
it?" Even if Halley decided to dismiss X's work as bunk, bogus, or ultimately
unhelpful, her silence as to the existence and relevance of X's work is
distracting, if not deafening.
While there are far too many examples to address in this reaction piece,
Halley's treatment of the Combahee River Collective Statement is
representative. While Halley recognizes that the statement is important to the
discourse on black feminism, Halley presents it as a flat document without
history, context, or contours. 55 In so doing, Halley misses an opportunity to
illustrate the virtue of a sexuality based split of the very type she endorses
throughout the text. Far from being a group of "unnamed black feminists,' ' 6 the
Collective was a group of well-known black lesbian feminists who, based on
their resistance to rigid formulations of feminism, split from a larger group of
black feminists over issues of class and homophobia. 57 What could be the
reasons for this? Did Halley abandon her commitment to depth? Or does the
negation of this important historical split disprove her convergence theory or
the justification for her intervention? Engaging the Combahee Collective's
statement without acknowledging that the organization and its statement arose
from a black feminist versus black lesbian split further undermines the faith
Halley's readers must have if they are to accept (or seriously contemplate) her
intervention.
The central aim of my critique here is not to deploy a moral mandate that
any genealogy of feminism must include comprehensive histories of radical,
black feminists or those who have engaged in fierce resistance to feminism. I
55. See id. at 84.
56. Id. at 82.
57. ROBIN D.G. KELLEY, FREEDOM DREAMS: THE BLACK RADICAL IMAGINATION 148-50 (2002).
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do, however, maintain that such a substantial omission is problematic. Even
more problematic is the fact that by limiting her analysis of the implications of
resistance projects that inform her own work (whether accepted or not), Halley
misses golden opportunities to attain the head nodding agreement upon which
the persuasiveness, indeed the ultimate success, of her intervention depends.
III. Go WEST, YOUNG MAN!
Halley seeks to impact discourse and explore new frontiers in theory and
political possibilities in Split Decisions yet fails to acknowledge innovations
such as OUTCrit theory and politics.58 Nonetheless, Halley takes a large,
adventurous step in the development of describing feminism, feminist theory,
and feminist legal theory.
These are valuable insights and contributions. She continues to build upon
her willingness to be vulnerable when she shares those moments of paralysis
that result from strategic deployment of moral mandates and appeals to
unlimited powerlessness. Halley is on to something when she describes how
she experiences the sharpening of knives waiting for a misstep. Halley checks
the power of race critiques, indeed any outsider critique, in a novel way-
marginalizing the mainstream. Unfortunately, Halley does not take this issue on
directly.
Halley's intervention in this forbidden realm of intrafeminist race and
power critique would be groundbreaking-and terrifying. Fortunately, there are
role models that may prove useful to Halley if she takes up this challenge:
Martha Fineman and Shane Phelan. They both have taken on many of the splits
Halley alludes to in Split Decisions in a non-convergentist (read
"intersectionality") way. They have stepped boldly into the fray of sexuality
and race and improved the discourse as a result.59 Martha Fineman has been an
important figure in Western feminism for many years-in theory and practice,
she joyfully and bravely embraces the split that causes Halley so much
consternation: race. Fineman instituted a forum explicitly designed to revel in
the splits of race and sexuality, among other splits. Fineman's Uncomfortable
Conversations series 60 is one of the few places where splits, including those
created by race differences, are treated as conversation starters rather than
silencers.
58. This term is used to describe race, fern, queer, lat, and other crits that attempt to "expose and
dismantle entrenched rules, structures and conditions that breed injustice." Francisco Valdrs, Outsider
Scholars, Critical Race Theory, and "OUTCrit" Perspectivity: Postsubordination Vision as
Jurisprudential Method, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY 403
(Francisco Valdrs et al. eds., 2002). The term, although not the concept, was coined by queer race
theorist and co-founder of LATCRIT, Inc., Francisco Valdrs.
59. See ELIZABETH V. SPELLMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST
THOUGHT (1988).
60. The workshop is now housed at Emory Law School.
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Shane Phelan is another white feminist theorist who seems to joyfully
embrace the complexities of power, race, sexuality, and feminism. In her book,
Getting Specific: Postmodern Lesbian Politics, Phelan locates "[m]any of the
best discussions of the problems of diversity and overlapping networks of
domination" within feminist theory. 6 1 The novelty of Halley's suggestions in
Split Decisions should be assessed in light of Phelan's conclusion that "lesbian
feminist theorists had been mistaken in their construction of too-monolithic,
often essentialist 'lesbian."' 62 Phelan goes on to say that white women need to
inquire into their own histories, asking themselves about their own racism,
classism, sexism, and heterosexism, "rather than engaging in amateur
anthropology toward people of color."63 More than advocating intersectionality,
Phelan calls for self-critique.
What Halley brings to the table is her willingness to flip Phelan's challenge
and critique the "amateur anthropology" of feminists of color. Whatever her
spin (or flip), Halley would continue to show willingness to be simultaneously
vulnerable and brave by "calling out" hybrid feminists (black feminists,
feminists of color, post-colonial feminists) on her experience with the fear and
loathing that takes place around those tables where feminists, queers, lefties,
lesbians, intellectuals, and activists gather to sort out theory and try to "get in
the problem." If Halley could, that would be novel and useful.
Halley is well-suited to embark on this territory because she has already
started down the road. And because Split Decisions establishes her as brave
(she continues to go into those rooms in spite of the sharpened knives), queer,
and cool.
Yes, I think she's cool and I think she is right to critique the critique of
women of color who challenge white feminists without also challenging their
(ok, our) appeals to powerlessness and exertions of power.
61. SHANE PHELAN, GETTING SPECIFIC: POSTMODERN LESBIAN POLITICS xviii (1994) (emphasis
added).
62. Id. at ix.
63. Id. at xv.
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